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The Pesky Persistence of Class Action Tolling in Mass
Tort Multidistrict Litigation
Jeremy T. Grabill*
ABSTRACT
Notwithstanding the fact that personal injury claims are no
longer certified as class actions for purposes of adjudication (i.e., as
“litigation classes”), the class action tolling doctrine is alive and
well in various jurisdictions across the country, and it is a feature of
state law that transferee courts must grapple with in mass tort
multidistrict litigations (MDLs). The pesky persistence of the class
action tolling doctrine allows individual statutes of limitations for
potential plaintiffs to be tolled in many jurisdictions by virtue of the
mere filing of a putative personal injury class action in a related
case. In contemporary mass tort MDLs, which are increasingly
being resolved by non-class aggregate settlements, it is simply not
true that “a little tolling never hurt anyone.” Rather, by permitting
and/or encouraging potential plaintiffs to sit in the shadows and not
come forward to assert their claims, the class action tolling doctrine
can delay and altogether undermine efforts to resolve modern mass
tort litigation by creating disabling uncertainty about current and
future plaintiff populations.
This Article argues that transferee courts should reexamine their
current tendency to defer consideration of class action issues in
mass tort MDLs; instead, transferee courts should issue an
“omnibus class action pretrial order” at the inception of any MDL
that contains at least one putative personal injury class action. That
omnibus order can rely on the long line of well-established
precedent rejecting certification of personal injury litigation classes
and should do at least four things: (i) strike all current and future
personal injury class allegations from all current and future
complaints in the MDL; (ii) deny all current and future requests for
personal injury claims to be certified as litigation classes; (iii)
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explicitly provide that the purpose of the order is to suspend any and
all tolling of the applicable statute(s) of limitations that might
otherwise occur as a result of the class action tolling doctrine; and
(iv) make clear that the parties are not precluded from subsequently
seeking certification of one or more settlement classes. Such an
order would short-circuit any harmful impact the class action
tolling doctrine might otherwise impose without precluding the
parties from subsequently seeking to use the class action device to
implement a global settlement. Ultimately, this is a modest
modification of current MDL practice that should be implemented in
mass tort cases.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Introduction ............................................................................. 435

II.

The Demise of Personal Injury Litigation Classes and the
Emergence of Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation .................. 442
A. Personal Injury Litigation Classes Are No Longer
Certified ............................................................................. 443
1. Lack of Class Cohesion .............................................. 444
2. Choice-of-Law Complexities ..................................... 449
3. Discomfort with All-or-Nothing Adversarial
Proceedings .................................................................451
B. Contemporary Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation ........... 455
1. Pretrial Management Techniques ...............................457
2. Modern Methods for Achieving Global
Resolution ................................................................... 460
a. Private Mass Tort Settlements .............................461
b. Class Action Settlements...................................... 461

III. The Pesky Persistence of the Class Action Tolling
Doctrine ...............................................................................463
A. American Pipe and Its Progeny ........................................ 464
B. Class Action Tolling in Personal Injury Litigation .......... 467
C. Class Action Tolling Can Undermine Efforts to
Resolve Mass Tort Litigation ........................................... 470
IV. MDL Transferee Courts Should Short-Circuit the Class
Action Tolling Doctrine ..........................................................473

2014]

CLASS ACTION TOLLING IN MASS TORT MDL

435

A. Omnibus Denial of Class Action Status for Putative
Litigation Classes .............................................................. 474
B. Parties Can Subsequently Seek Certification of
Settlement Classes ............................................................ 477
C. CAFA Considerations ....................................................... 478
V.

Conclusion ............................................................................... 481
I. INTRODUCTION

Courts may authorize the use of class actions in two essential
ways—the claims of one or more class representatives may be
certified for purposes of adjudication (“litigation classes”) or for
purposes of settlement (“settlement classes”).1 Although mass tort
litigation continues to be occasionally resolved via class action
settlements,2 it is essentially unquestionable that personal injury
claims can no longer be certified as litigation classes.3 As the
1. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to
Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 775, 793 (2010) (noting that “the settlement class . . . appears to
have displaced the litigation class as the dominant form of class certification,”
although “the existing empirical evidence is consistent with the thesis that class
certification [in general] has become less likely” following the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)). In federal
court, the class certification analysis under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure differs slightly depending on whether the parties are seeking
certification of a litigation class or a settlement class. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
Stepping back from the distinction between litigation classes and settlement
classes for a moment, “[t]he paradigmatic application of the modern class action
[as a procedural vehicle] . . . is to make civil claims marketable that otherwise
would not be brought on an individual basis.” Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 99 (2009).
2. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
3. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1089 (6th Cir. 1996)
(identifying “a national trend to deny class certification in drug or medical product
liability/personal injury cases”). The discussion of “personal injury” claims in this
Article should be understood to include claims for monetary damages arising from
both non-fatal and fatal injuries. It should also be noted here that issues concerning
tolling for non-personal injury claims are beyond the scope of this Article, largely
because certain non-personal injury claims may still be amenable to class
certification in mass tort litigation. See, e.g., In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading
Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming certification of
a class of consumers that had purchased allegedly defective washing machines);
Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming certification of
two consumer fraud classes in defective window litigation and noting that “[w]hile
consumer fraud class actions present problems that courts must carefully consider
before granting certification, there is not and should not be a rule that they never
can be certified”); Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 06-12234, 2012 WL
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American Law Institute recently explained, “This development
reflects many factors,” including “difficulties presented by choiceof-law problems” and “the need for individual evidence of exposure,
injury, and damages.”4 Thus, whenever a discrete accident or event,
harmful substance or condition, or defective drug, device, or product
is suspected of causing similar injuries to multiple people in the
United States, plaintiffs must generally pursue relief by filing
individual lawsuits—and the “mass tort” moniker refers to the
resulting influx of hundreds or thousands of related cases into the
judicial system.5 Those individual cases will often be filed in both
state and federal courts, and while some cases may remain in state
courts for jurisdictional reasons,6 it is increasingly common for

957633 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2012) (denying defendant’s motion to decertify a
single-state class of former smokers that was only asserting claims for medical
monitoring); Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597 (E.D. La. 2006)
(certifying a class of plaintiffs asserting claims for property damage arising from
an oil spill during Hurricane Katrina).
4. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION § 1.02, at 25 (2010). See also infra Part II.A.
5. The “mass tort” moniker may be somewhat misleading because often the
claims that arise in such situations go beyond traditional tort claims and can also
include a variety of contract, warranty, fraud, economic loss, environmental, and
statutory claims. That said, mass torts come in two varieties—they are either
localized or dispersed in space and time. See Jeremy T. Grabill, Multistate Class
Actions Properly Frustrated by Choice-of-Law Complexities: The Role of Parallel
Litigation in the Courts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 299, 304–05 (2005) (discussing “single
situs” and “widespread” torts); see also Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for
Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 129, 129 (1989) (“[T]here are two forms of the ‘mass tort.’ In one, the same
event killed or injured the victims. In the other, injuries occur over a period of time
and at different locations but have the same cause, typically a defective product.”);
Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 1105, 1120 (2010) (“Mass tort litigation today . . . focuses overwhelmingly
on alleged product defects that are not of a one-off nature but, instead, concern the
design of products or the warnings conveyed with them—aspects that implicate all
those who consumed the disputed product, not just an unlucky few who might
encounter an anomalous manufacturing defect.”).
6. Recent expansions of federal subject matter jurisdiction, however, have
increased the degree of aggregation that can be accomplished in the federal courts.
For example, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) expanded federal
diversity jurisdiction over putative class actions where the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million and minimal diversity exists between the parties (i.e., where
“any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant”). See Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
1332(d), 1453, and 1711–15); see also infra Part IV.C. Another example is the
U.S. Supreme Court’s recent holding that federal district courts may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over class members’ claims even if those claims do not
independently satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, provided that “at
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related mass tort cases pending in federal courts across the country
to be transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML) from their home districts to one “transferee” judge for
“coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings” pursuant to the
multidistrict litigation (MDL) statute.7
Despite these developments, plaintiffs’ lawyers continue to file
“putative” personal injury class actions. In this context, the term
“putative” is used during the period prior to a court ruling on class
certification to refer to a case that has been styled as a class action in
the complaint.8 Why do putative personal injury class actions
continue to be filed? It is conceivable that some plaintiffs’ lawyers
do so with the hope that such cases will be assigned to rogue trial
court judges willing to certify litigation classes, thereby placing
significant pressure on the defendants to settle.9 It could also be

least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy
requirement.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549
(2005).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1407. See generally Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill &
Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 2323, 2326–30 (2008) (discussing the modern multidistrict litigation
process); John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82
TUL. L. REV. 2225, 2225 n.1 (2008) (“In MDL parlance, the court to which an
action or actions are transferred (or centralized) under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 is referred
to as the ‘transferee’ court, and the court from which the action or actions are
transferred is called the ‘transferor’ court.”).
8. In other words, although plaintiffs’ counsel may craft a complaint as a
class action, the case does not actually obtain class action status until a court
certifies the class as complying with the necessary statutory requirements.
Similarly, a “putative” class member is someone who falls within the complaint’s
class definition—but again, a court order certifying the class is necessary before
anyone actually becomes a class member. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles,
133 S. Ct. 1345, 1346 (2013) (“[A] plaintiff who files a proposed class action
cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified.”).
Nevertheless, putative class members may enjoy certain judicial protections. See,
e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.12 (4th ed. 2004) (“Rule 23(d)
authorizes the court to regulate communications with potential class members,
even before certification.”); see also, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179,
2011 WL 323866 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011) (regulating the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility’s communications with putative class members); Edward F. Sherman, The
BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving Supervision of Multidistrict Litigation
Judges, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 237 (2011) (discussing Judge Barbier’s regulation of
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility’s communications with putative class members in
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill litigation).
9. See infra note 65. Prior to 1998, the only generally available avenue for
immediate review of an order certifying a class action was via a petition for a writ
of mandamus—but, of course, “mandamus is issued only in extraordinary cases.”
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir. 1995) (“An order
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possible that plaintiffs’ lawyers file putative personal injury class
actions simply as placeholders for possible settlement classes down
the line, notwithstanding the modern trend toward the use of nonclass aggregate settlements in mass tort litigation.10 But the
predominant reason behind the continued filing of putative personal
injury class actions is likely the persistence of a favorable legal
doctrine known as “class action tolling.”
The U.S. Supreme Court originally recognized the class action
tolling doctrine in 1974 in American Pipe & Construction Co. v.
Utah.11 Generally, the class action tolling doctrine provides that the
filing of a putative class action tolls or suspends the applicable
statute(s) of limitations for all putative class members until class
certification is denied.12 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in
American Pipe, the class action tolling doctrine has been adopted

certifying a class is not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . .
and it has been held not to fit any of the exceptions to the rule that confines federal
appellate jurisdiction to final decisions.”). But see Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996) (exercising jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal
of a class certification order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and decertifying the
class). As a matter of federal procedure, the availability of appellate review for
orders “granting or denying class-action certification” was expanded in 1998. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order
granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for
permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is
entered.”). Even today, however, there is no absolute right to appeal a federal court
order certifying a class action, and if the court of appeals denies permission to
appeal under Rule 23(f), mandamus may still be the only way to seek immediate
review of such an order.
10. See generally Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort
Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 123 (2012) (discussing the emerging nonclass opt-in paradigm for aggregate mass tort settlements).
11. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
12. See infra Part III.A. It is worth emphasizing that tolling generally stops
upon the district court’s denial of class certification. That said, the law appears to
be somewhat unclear regarding whether this general rule should be modified when
an order denying certification is subsequently reversed on appeal. Compare
Giovanniello v. ALM Media, LLC, 726 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We now take
this opportunity to join our sister circuits and hold that American Pipe tolling does
not extend beyond the denial of class status.”), with Hall v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 727 F.3d 372, 376 n.8 (5th Cir. 2013) (“If a denial of certification is
reversed on appeal, the putative class members can claim the benefit of
uninterrupted tolling from the original class action filing date.”). In any event, that
issue has been addressed elsewhere, and it is beyond the scope of this Article
given that orders denying certification of personal injury claims are rarely, if ever,
reversed on appeal. See generally Kevin Welsh, Comment, Collision Course: How
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) Has Silently Undermined the Prohibition on
American Pipe Tolling During Appeals of Class Certification Denials, 73 LA. L.
REV. 1183 (2013).
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and applied in different ways to state law personal injury claims by
various state courts and federal courts sitting in diversity.13 And
despite the demise of the personal injury litigation class, the class
action tolling doctrine persists in a variety of forms and
permutations in jurisdictions across the country; thus, it is a feature
of state law with which MDL transferee courts must grapple.
Notwithstanding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s statement
that “[a]t an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a
class representative, the court must determine by order whether to
certify the action as a class action,” the issue of class certification is
often deferred in contemporary mass tort MDL practice.14 For
example, in the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill multidistrict
litigation, plaintiffs’ counsel filed multiple putative class actions and
various master complaints that also included class action
allegations.15 But in an early pretrial order, the transferee court
imposed a broad stay of all motion practice and discovery on class
certification issues within the MDL.16 Similarly, plaintiffs’ counsel
filed various putative class actions as part of the prominent MDL
involving the pharmaceutical drug Vioxx, but the transferee court
did not address the issue of class certification for personal injury
claims until more than a year and a half after the MDL was
created.17 Unfortunately, and perhaps unbeknownst to transferee
13. For a discussion of the various permutations of the class action tolling
doctrine, see infra Part III.B.
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). From 1966 until 2003, this provision read as
follows: “As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.”
The change from “as soon as practicable” to “at an early practicable time” was
intended to recognize that “many circumstances may justify deferring the
certification decision,” such as allowing time for limited discovery “in aid of the
certification decision” or for exploring “designation of class counsel” or “interim
counsel.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee note (2003). In his concurring
opinion in American Pipe, Justice Blackmun relied on the earlier version of this
provision to assume that the class certification decision “will normally be made
expeditiously.” Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 562 (1974)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
15. See infra notes 92–99 and accompanying text for further details about the
BP Deepwater Horizon MDL.
16. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010) (Pretrial Order
No. 11) para. VII, available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders
/PTO11.pdf (“Local Rule 23.1 and Federal Rule 23 motion practice and discovery
on class certification issues is hereby stayed for all cases until further order of this
Court.”).
17. Compare In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La. 2006)
(denying plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a nationwide personal injury class
action), with In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005)
(creating MDL 1657).
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courts, the statutes of limitations for putative class members are
likely to be tolled in many jurisdictions until the transferee court
affirmatively strikes personal injury class allegations or otherwise
denies class action status to personal injury claims styled as putative
class actions.
This Article describes the ways in which the pesky persistence
of the class action tolling doctrine can undermine efforts to resolve
modern mass tort litigation. In the MDL context, given the threat of
remand that the MDL statute confers upon transferee courts, it is
inevitable that a time will come when the parties begin thinking
about a potential global settlement.18 And when that time comes, it
is extremely helpful—if not essential—that the universe of plaintiffs
making claims be known with relative certainty so that appropriate
valuation decisions can be made and the defendants can have
reasonable comfort that a wave of new claims will not emerge after
a settlement is announced. Class action tolling frustrates both of
those conditions by allowing and even encouraging potential
plaintiffs to sit in the shadows and not come forward to assert their
claims.19 In light of the reality that personal injury litigation classes
are no longer certified, putative class members clearly should not
benefit from the windfall of an extended limitations period simply
because someone has filed a putative personal injury class action in
a related case. Indeed, as Justice Blackmun noted in his concurring
opinion in American Pipe, the Court’s decision “must not be
regarded as encouragement to lawyers . . . to frame their pleadings
as a class action, intentionally, to attract and save members of the
purported class who have slept on their rights.”20
Contrary to the suggestion of several prior commentators,
however, it is not necessary or advisable for the class action tolling

18. The MDL statute “obligates the [JPML] to remand any pending case to its
originating court when . . . pretrial proceedings have run their course.” Lexecon
Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 34 (1998). The usual
procedure is for the transferee court to “suggest” to the JPML that remand is
appropriate. See generally In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832
F. Supp. 2d 74, 76–78 (D. Me. 2011) (discussing the standards to be used in
determining “when—short of trial—the transferee court’s work is done”).
19. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the
Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1159
(2011) (noting that class action tolling “allows a single plaintiff to satisfy the
limitations period for a vast group of yet unidentified potential plaintiffs who have,
in many instances, taken no action at all to pursue their claims”).
20. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 562 (1974) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). See also Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring) (reiterating Justice Blackmun’s precautionary words).
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doctrine to be abolished in its entirety.21 Moreover, abolition may
not even be practical given that the class action tolling doctrine has
been adopted as a matter of state law in various jurisdictions. Thus,
even if one sought to eliminate the doctrine only in the mass tort
context, short of convincing various state courts of last resort to
abandon their prior decisions embracing class action tolling
principles, coordinated legislative reform would need to occur in
jurisdictions throughout the country.22 Rather, the modest proposal
set forth herein is that transferee courts should reexamine their
current tendency to defer consideration of class action issues in mass
tort MDLs and instead issue an “omnibus class action pretrial order”
at the inception of any MDL that contains at least one putative
personal injury class action. That omnibus order could be entered by
the transferee court sua sponte or upon a motion by the defendant(s),
and it should do at least four things: (i) strike all current and future
personal injury class allegations from all current and future
complaints in the MDL; (ii) deny all current and future requests for
personal injury claims to be certified as litigation classes; (iii)
explicitly provide that the purpose of the order is to suspend any and
all tolling of the applicable statute(s) of limitations that might
otherwise occur as a result of the class action tolling doctrine; and
(iv) make clear that the parties are not precluded from subsequently
seeking certification of one or more settlement classes.
The current practice of transferee courts to defer consideration
of class action issues in mass tort MDLs is understandable given the
predictable and obvious result of the certification inquiry (e.g.,
certification of personal injury litigation classes will be denied) and
21. For example, it has been argued that class action tolling should not be
applied in mass tort litigation because “notice in class actions will rarely be
adequate to apprise mass tort personal injury defendants of the evidence they need
to gather” to defend against each class member’s claim “before that evidence
becomes stale.” Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Norman Menachem Feder, The
Impropriety of Class Action Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes of Limitations, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 532, 577, 580 (1996). Other practitioners have made similar
arguments against the application of the class action tolling doctrine in mass tort
litigation. See JOHN H. BEISNER & JESSICA D. MILLER, LITIGATE THE TORTS, NOT
THE MASS: A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING HOW MASS TORTS ARE
ADJUDICATED (2009), available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/beisner09.pdf.
22. In order to abolish the class action tolling doctrine either in whole or in
part, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and analogous state law rules
of procedure would need to be amended to provide either that personal injury
claims cannot be certified as litigation classes or that the filing of putative personal
injury class actions does not toll any otherwise applicable statute(s) of limitations
for putative class members. Additionally, or alternatively, state legislatures could
amend their statutes of limitations for personal injury claims to provide explicitly
that the filing of a putative personal injury class action does not toll the time
periods established by those statutes for unnamed putative class members.
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the reality that more pressing matters are bound to exist. Such a
triaged approach, however, allows the class action tolling doctrine to
wreak havoc in the background by creating uncertainty about
plaintiff populations. The omnibus class action pretrial order that
this Article proposes would short-circuit any harmful impact the
class action tolling doctrine might otherwise impose and need not
unduly distract transferee courts because the order can be based on
the long line of well-established precedent refusing to certify
personal injury claims as litigation classes.23 Moreover, the omnibus
class action pretrial order would not preclude the transferee court
from subsequently certifying a personal injury settlement class
because (i) a district court’s class certification decision is always
subject to revision and (ii) the traditional Rule 23 analysis is
modified in the settlement class context, such that an order denying
certification for a litigation class cannot have collateral estoppel
effect on a subsequent request to certify a settlement class.
Ultimately, both law and practice must account for the dual realities
that personal injury class actions are no longer certified for purposes
of adjudication and that the efficient and successful resolution of
modern mass tort litigation often requires relative certainty
regarding current and future plaintiff populations.
II. THE DEMISE OF PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION CLASSES AND THE
EMERGENCE OF MASS TORT MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
Before delving into the details of how the class action tolling
doctrine operates and impacts contemporary mass tort litigation, it is
first necessary to discuss why personal injury claims are no longer
certified as litigation classes and how the judiciary has turned to
multidistrict litigation as the primary mechanism for organizing and
resolving mass tort claims in the post-class action era. This
preliminary discussion will not only provide helpful procedural
context for understanding the ways in which the class action tolling
doctrine currently threatens the fair and efficient resolution of mass
tort litigation, but it will also set forth the legal justifications that
transferee courts may quickly rely on to issue an “omnibus class
action pretrial order” at the inception of any MDL that contains at
least one putative personal injury class action.

23. See supra notes 3–4; see also infra Part II.A.
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A. Personal Injury Litigation Classes Are No Longer Certified
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the use
of class actions in the federal courts.24 As amended in 1966, Rule 23
contemplates various forms of class actions—most notably the Rule
23(b)(3) damages “opt-out” class action.25 So-called “(b)(3)” class
actions may be maintained if common questions of law or fact
predominate over individualized issues and class resolution is
superior to other available methods of adjudication.26 Provided that
a court finds that all of the necessary statutory requirements are
satisfied, a single class representative seeking money damages can
litigate and/or settle on behalf of—and bind—all similarly situated
individuals who do not take the affirmative step of opting out of the
class action.27
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. As an initial matter, Rule 23 requires that four
prerequisites be satisfied before any class action may be certified: numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
The jurisprudence has recognized a fifth prerequisite, namely “ascertainability.”
See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2013 WL 4437225 (3d Cir. Aug.
21, 2013).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
26. Id. The other types of class actions include Rule 23(b)(1)(A) incompatible
standards classes, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund classes, and Rule 23(b)(2) classes
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. Unlike the (b)(3) class action, the (b)(1)
and (b)(2) varieties are “mandatory” class actions, meaning that “Rule 23 does not
provide for absent class members to receive notice and to exclude themselves from
class membership as a matter of right.” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,
833 n.13 (1999). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has described the
various types of class actions as follows:
Under Rule 23, the different categories of class actions, with their
different requirements, represent a balance struck in each case between
the need and efficiency of a class action and the interests of class
members to pursue their claims separately or not at all. The different
types of class actions are categorized according to the nature or effect of
the relief being sought. The (b)(1) class action encompasses cases in
which the defendant is obliged to treat class members alike or where
class members are making claims against a fund insufficient to satisfy all
claims. The (b)(2) class action, on the other hand, was intended to focus
on cases where broad, class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief is
necessary. Finally, the (b)(3) class action was intended to dispose of all
other cases in which a class action would be “convenient and desirable,”
including those involving large-scale, complex litigation for money
damages. Limiting the different categories of class actions to specific
kinds of relief clearly reflects a concern for how the interests of the class
member will vary, depending on the nature of the class injury alleged and
the nature of the relief sought.
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum, 151 F.3d 402, 411–12 (5th Cir. 1998).
27. “For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class
members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including
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The Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules who
drafted the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 recognized that the new
(b)(3) class action was “the most adventuresome” innovation of
those amendments.28 The Advisory Committee itself even noted at
the time that a “‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous
persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the
likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of
liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the
individuals in different ways.”29 Only in the past twenty years,
however, have courts taken this guidance to heart and begun to
almost categorically refuse certification of personal injury litigation
classes.30 As described below, the two most commonly cited
roadblocks to the certification of personal injury litigation classes
are the lack of class cohesion and the existence of choice-of-law
complexities. Additionally, with so much at stake in mass tort
litigation, several courts have also expressed discomfort with one
adversarial proceeding resolving the rights and liabilities of all
interested parties once and for all.
1. Lack of Class Cohesion
The downfall of personal injury litigation classes must be traced
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1997 rejection of a proposed class
action settlement of personal injury claims in Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor.31 Although the ambitious and wide-ranging putative
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Among other things, such notice must “clearly and
concisely state in plain, easily understood language . . . that the court will exclude
from the class any member who requests exclusion [and] the time and manner for
requesting exclusion.” Id. Notwithstanding these provisions, a leading empirical
study has found that opt-out rates are “trivially small in the mass of cases.”
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in
Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1529, 1532–34 (2004).
28. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (quoting
Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497
(1969)).
29. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 844 n.20 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory
committee’s notes (1966)).
30. See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 5, at 1170 (“The modern Rule 23
represented the new procedural kid on the block in 1966, a vital innovation at the
time. As the rule now enters its middle age, one might say that a more elaborated
sense has emerged not only about its genuine usefulness but also about its welltaken limitations.”).
31. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). This is not to suggest, however, that no court had
rejected certification of personal injury claims prior to Amchem. For example, in
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settlement class in Amchem presented a variety of problematic
issues that a more modest litigation class could largely avoid, the
Supreme Court’s discussion of the lack of “class cohesion” in
Amchem laid the foundation that subsequent courts have relied upon
to reject certification of litigation classes in even routine putative
personal injury class actions.32
In Amchem, the Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s
certification of a “sprawling” settlement class of “hundreds of
thousands, perhaps millions, of individuals” connected by the
“commonality” that “[e]ach was, or some day may be, adversely
affected by past exposure to asbestos products manufactured by one
or more of 20 companies.”33 The putative personal injury class
consisted of “persons occupationally exposed to defendants’
asbestos products, and members of their families.”34 The Supreme
Court agreed with the Third Circuit’s reasoning that the putative
class failed to satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement of
Rule 23(a) and the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).35

1984, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus
directing the district judge presiding over the Bendectin multidistrict litigation to
vacate his order certifying a Rule 23(b)(1) class of plaintiffs allegedly injured by
in utero exposure to the prescription drug. See In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig.,
749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984). Other courts had previously rejected class
certification of personal injury claims under Rule 23(b)(3) as well. See, e.g.,
Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 398–99 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(refusing to certify class action in litigation arising from an aircraft crash in
Indonesia). But the pre-Amchem decisions by and large did not focus on the core
lack-of-cohesion defect in putative personal injury class actions identified in
Amchem.
32. See infra notes 43–45. Two years later, in Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815, the
Supreme Court held that a similar asbestos settlement class could not be certified
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). The Supreme Court’s discussion in Ortiz focused
primarily on the “conditions for certifying a mandatory settlement class on a
limited fund theory,” and not on the lack of class cohesion in personal injury
cases. Id. at 821. However, by referencing “our deep-rooted historic tradition that
everyone should have his own day in court” and the “inherent tension between
representative suits and the day-in-court ideal,” Justice Souter’s majority opinion
in Ortiz implicitly reinforced the rationale of Amchem. Id. at 846 (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
33. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597. As the Supreme Court explained, a “settlement
class” is one that is “not intended to be litigated.” Id. at 601. In Amchem, for
example, “within the space of a single day, January 15, 1993, the settling parties . . .
presented to the District Court a complaint, an answer, a proposed settlement
agreement, and a joint motion for conditional class certification.” Id. at 601–02.
34. Id. at 605.
35. The Supreme Court also suggested, though did not decide, that it might
not “ever” be possible to give “class action notice sufficient under the Constitution
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The adequacy of representation defect in Amchem resulted from
the novel structure of the wider settlement landscape that was being
pursued in the asbestos litigation at that time. The putative class in
Amchem was crafted by counsel to include only future claimants that
had not yet filed individual lawsuits (in many cases, likely because
an injury had not yet manifested); the claims of current plaintiffs
with manifest injuries were settled separately by the same counsel as
part of a two-pronged attempt to respond to the “asbestos-litigation
crisis.”36 The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the Third
Circuit’s conclusion that “serious intra-class conflicts precluded the
class from meeting the adequacy of representation requirement.”37
As the Supreme Court explained: “[T]he interests of those within the
single class are not aligned. Most saliently, for the currently injured,
the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs
against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample,
inflation-protected fund for the future.”38 Ultimately, as the Third
Circuit had concluded, “an undivided set of representatives could
not adequately protect the discrete interests of both currently
afflicted and exposure-only claimants.”39 Although the Supreme
Court’s analysis of the adequacy of representation defect in Amchem
obviously remains relevant, counsel can generally avoid this pitfall
and Rule 23 . . . to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous” as current and
future spouses and children of asbestos victims. Id. at 628.
36. Id. at 597–601 (discussing the findings of the March 1991 Report of the
United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation).
37. Id. at 610 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 630
(3d Cir. 1996)).
38. Id. at 626. The Third Circuit had made the same essential point: “The
[exposure-only plaintiffs] would rationally want protection against inflation for
distant recoveries. They would also seek sturdy back-end opt-out rights and
causation provisions that can keep pace with changing science and medicine,
rather than freezing in place the science of 1993. Already injured parties, in
contrast, would care little about such provisions and would rationally trade them
for higher current payouts.” Id. at 610–11 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
39. Id. at 611. See also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999)
(“[I]t is obvious after Amchem that a class divided between holders of present and
future claims (some of the latter involving no physical injury and attributable to
claimants not yet born) requires division into homogeneous subclasses under Rule
23(c)(4)(B), with separate representation to eliminate conflicting interests of
counsel.”). But see Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1323–24 (11th Cir.
2012) (rejecting a collateral attack challenging a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund
class action settlement approved by the district court in 1999 in the breast implant
multidistrict litigation notwithstanding the fact that subclasses were not created for
present and future claimants, and interpreting Amchem and Ortiz to merely call for
“some type of adequate structural protection [of adequate representation], which
would include, but may not necessarily require, formally designated subclasses”).
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by drafting class definitions to encompass only individuals that have
suffered some form of manifest injury.
The more influential aspects of Amchem for present purposes are
the Supreme Court’s recognition that “[t]he Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation” and the Court’s
associated discussion of the lack of class cohesion in personal injury
cases.40 In this regard, the Supreme Court began by identifying
relevant causation circumstances that would be unique for each
putative class member:
Class members were exposed to different asbestos-containing
products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and
over different periods. Some class members suffer no physical
injury or have only asymptomatic pleural changes, while
others suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from
mesothelioma . . . . Each has a different history of cigarette
smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry.41
In light of those individualized circumstances, the Supreme Court
concluded that the district court’s “certification [of the putative
class] cannot be upheld, for it rests on a conception of Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement irreconcilable with the Rule’s
design.”42
Although Amchem dealt specifically with a putative settlement
class, the Supreme Court’s reasoning has been followed by a long
line of decisions refusing to certify personal injury litigation classes
in a variety of factual scenarios. For example, in pharmaceutical and
medical device litigation, individualized issues such as the plaintiffs’
prior medical histories, the substance of interactions between
plaintiffs and their doctors, the doctors’ own reasons for prescribing
the drug or device at issue, and the content of the warnings that
accompanied the drug or device at different points in time will
40. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623.
41. Id. at 624 (quoting Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626). See also In re Asbestos
Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 976 n.8 (5th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that a “global class of
asbestos claimants” likely would not satisfy Rule 23 “due to the huge number of
individuals and their varying medical expenses, smoking histories, and family
situations”).
42. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625. In Ortiz, the Supreme Court reiterated that “the
determination whether ‘proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication’ must focus on ‘questions that preexist any settlement.’” Ortiz, 527
U.S. at 858 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622–23). See also RICHARD A.
NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 88 (2007) (“The Amchem
Court chided the district judge for concluding that the proposed class was cohesive
in the broad sense that all of its members, of course, would prefer to maximize the
overall settlement pot.”).
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preclude class certification.43 Similarly, in litigation involving other
types of products, individualized issues such as the plaintiffs’ prior
medical histories, the details regarding each plaintiff’s exposure
circumstance and relevant knowledge, and the nature of the
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries have been cited as roadblocks to class
certification.44 The same is true in litigation involving
environmental exposure to harmful substances, where individualized
issues such as the location and duration of the plaintiffs’ exposures,
the plaintiffs’ susceptibilities to illness, and the nature of the
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries will defeat class certification.45
All of these individualized issues bear on the question of specific
causation—namely, whether the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were in
fact caused by the drug, device, product, or exposure at issue.
Indeed, in mass tort personal injury litigation, “proof of wrongful
conduct on the part of the defendant tends not to establish liability
for compensatory damages . . . [because] further questions remain as
to the existence of specific causation.”46 As a result, regardless of
43. See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1080–82 (6th Cir.
1996); In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847,
854 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 396 nn.7–
8 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 461 (E.D. La.
2006); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61, 65–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In
re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 208 F.R.D. 625, 631–32 (W.D.
Wash. 2002).
44. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625; Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d
734, 743 n.15 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The class members were exposed to nicotine
through different products, for different amounts of time, and over different time
periods. Each class member’s knowledge about the effects of smoking differs, and
each plaintiff began smoking for different reasons.”); McBride v. Galaxy Carpet
Mills, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (denying certification to putative
class of plaintiffs alleging personal injuries caused by the chemical composition of
carpet manufactured by the defendants).
45. See, e.g., Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 602 (5th
Cir. 2006) (noting that class certification was inappropriate in an exposure case
because each plaintiff’s claim “will be highly individualized with respect to
proximate causation, including individual issues of exposure, susceptibility to
illness, and types of physical injuries”); In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1873, 2008 WL 5423488, at *12 (E.D. La. Dec. 29, 2008)
(recognizing that “there are significant and notable variations among the Plaintiffs
that affect whether, and the extent to which, any plaintiff was exposed to
formaldehyde and experienced health effects resulting from that exposure”); Rink
v. Cheminova, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 648, 651–52 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (refusing to certify
putative class of plaintiffs alleging injuries from exposure to chemical sprayed as
part of a statewide medfly eradication program because “the circumstances of each
individual’s exposure, the individual’s past and current medical history, and the
individual’s failure to mitigate” defeated a finding of predominance).
46. Nagareda, supra note 5, at 1134. See also Allison v. Citgo Petroleum
Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[A]s claims for individually based
money damages begin to predominate, the presumption of cohesiveness decreases
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the factual context, courts today almost universally recognize that
the lack of class cohesion precludes certification of personal injury
litigation classes.47
2. Choice-of-Law Complexities
In recent years, choice-of-law complexities have also frustrated
classwide treatment of state law personal injury claims.48 Before a
putative litigation class that is defined to include class members
from different states can be certified, the trial court must engage in a
choice-of-law analysis to determine whether multiple states’ laws
must be applied to the class members’ claims.49 This choice-of-law

while the need for enhanced procedural safeguards to protect the individual rights
of class members increases.”).
47. The most notable exception to this trend occurred in Mullen v. Treasure
Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 1999). The plaintiffs in Mullen were
former employees of a floating casino and brought a class action against the casino
alleging respiratory injuries (including asthma and bronchitis) as a result of the
casino’s allegedly defective air conditioning and ventilation system (which led to
“extremely smoky conditions” in the casino). The district court crafted a trial plan
that consisted of a Phase One class trial on common issues to be followed by
waves of individual Phase Two trials on individual issues of causation and
damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s certification of a “common issues” litigation class pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3) and held that the predominance requirement was satisfied because the
class members were “symptomatic by definition and claim[ed] injury from the
same defective ventilation system over the same general period of time.” Id. at
626–27. The Fifth Circuit also noted that the common issues in the case, notably
negligence and seaworthiness of the floating casino, were the most “pivotal.” Id.
48. See generally Grabill, supra note 5, at 309–11. As I have previously
argued, this development “should not be viewed as unnecessarily creating
duplicative litigation, but rather as ensuring that the judicial system enjoys the
benefits of parallel litigation of complex cases while respecting basic notions of
federalism.” Id. at 319. Nevertheless, others continue to search for “fixes” to this
purported choice-of-law “problem.” See Luke McCloud & David Rosenberg, A
Solution to the Choice of Law Problem of Differing State Laws in Class Actions:
Average Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374, 375 (2011) (arguing that “applying the
average of the differing state laws can overcome [the] choice of law impediment
to using class actions without compromising the functioning of civil liability in
any significant way”); Linda Siberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National
Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2022–34 (2008) (advocating the adoption
of an “independent federal choice of law rule”).
49. See, e.g., Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 311–14 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The
district court is required to know which law will apply before it makes its
predominance determination [under Rule 23(b)(3)].”); Castano, 84 F.3d at 741–43
(“[V]ariations in state law [must not] swamp any common issues and defeat
predominance.”). Federal courts sitting in diversity must generally apply the
choice-of-law rules of the forum state. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,

450

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

inquiry is part of the “rigorous analysis” that trial courts must
conduct when determining whether to certify a putative class
action.50
More often than not, in putative personal injury class actions, the
relevant choice-of-law rules will require that the putative class
members’ claims be governed by their home states’ laws. For
example, “the majority of states have adopted the choice-of-law
rules set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,”51
which provide that “[t]he rights and liabilities of the parties with
respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties.”52 Several states,
however, “still apply the lex loci delicti principle, which was
presented in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, and
generally requires courts to apply the law of ‘the state where the last
event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes
place.’”53 But regardless of which choice-of-law regime applies,
courts typically conclude that a plaintiff’s personal injury claims
must be governed by his or her home state’s law.54 This result has

313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). In cases transferred into a multidistrict litigation
proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, however, the transferee court must apply
the choice-of-law rules of the transferor forum. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494
U.S. 516, 523–25 (1990).
50. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). See also
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (reaffirming that
trial courts must conduct a “rigorous analysis” before certifying class actions, even
if that analysis “overlap[s] with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim”).
Courts must also ensure that their choice of law in putative class actions does not
violate “the constitutional limitations on choice of law mandated by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of Article IV, § 1.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816 (1985). In
that regard, “for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)).
51. Grabill, supra note 5, at 302.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971).
53. Grabill, supra note 5, at 303 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 377 (1934)).
54. For example, in Amchem, the Third Circuit noted that “[v]ariations in
state law magnify” the individual factual differences among plaintiffs. Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). See also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1301 (7th Cir. 1995) (implicitly recognizing that plaintiffs’
claims would be governed by their home state law and noting that “[t]he voices of
the quasi-sovereigns that are the states of the United States sing negligence with . . .
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previously been described as creating a “complexity of application”
that will often frustrate a putative class’s ability to satisfy Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements.55
3. Discomfort with All-or-Nothing Adversarial Proceedings
In addition to the lack of cohesion and choice-of-law issues
discussed above, some courts have also expressed a general
discomfort with allowing hundreds or thousands of mass tort claims
to be resolved by one trial. That discomfort often manifests itself in
a finding that a proposed class action is not “superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.”56 The two leading cases expressing this view are In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.57 and Castano v. American Tobacco
Co.58 from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Fifth
Circuits, respectively.
Rhone-Poulenc involved a putative class of hemophiliacs
allegedly infected by the AIDS virus as a result of using tainted
blood solids manufactured by the defendants.59 Notably, the district
court did not certify the entire case as a class action but instead
certified the case pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) “‘as a class action with
respect to particular issues.’”60 As understood by the Seventh
Circuit, the district court envisioned “the rendition by a jury of a
special verdict that would answer a number of questions bearing,

different pitch[es]”); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 458 (E.D. La.
2006) (holding that New Jersey’s choice-of-law rules required that “the substantive
law of each plaintiff’s home jurisdiction must be applied to his or her respective
claims”); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61, 67–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(noting that the court “likely would be obliged to apply the laws of all fifty states”
to the plaintiffs’ personal injury claims).
55. See Grabill, supra note 5, at 306–08; see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that
because the class members’ claims “must be adjudicated under the law of so many
jurisdictions, a single nationwide class is not manageable”). Of course, there may
be situations where the competing state laws are not in conflict, and, in those
situations, the mere need to apply multiple states’ laws may not categorically
prevent class certification. See Grabill, supra note 5, at 312–13 (collecting
authorities).
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
57. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
58. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
59. In re Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294–95.
60. Id. at 1297 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(A)). The court noted that
“differences in the date of infection alone of the thousands of potential class
members would make [certification of the entire case under Rule 23(b)(3)]
infeasible.” Id. at 1296–97.
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perhaps decisively, on whether the defendants [were] negligent.”61
Assuming the issues-class trial resulted in a finding of negligence,
“individual members of the class would then file individual tort suits
in state and federal district courts around the nation and would use
the special verdict, in conjunction with the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, to block relitigation of the issue of negligence.”62 The
defendants challenged the issues-class certification by seeking a writ
of mandamus from the Seventh Circuit.
Notwithstanding the court’s recognition that “mandamus is
issued only in extraordinary cases,”63 the Seventh Circuit granted
the defendants’ petition and decertified the issues class.64 The court
was particularly concerned that the defendants would be “under
intense pressure to settle” as a result of the certification order.65 At
the time of the decision, approximately 300 similar lawsuits had
been filed involving some 400 plaintiffs.66 There had also been 13
individual trials, and the defendants had won 12 of them.67
Extrapolating from these statistics, the court estimated that, but for
the certification order, the defendants might be facing liability in
61. Id. at 1297.
62. Id. This is essentially the same approach being used in the so-called
“Engle progeny” cases percolating through the Florida state courts in which
plaintiffs allege smoking-related injuries. In Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.
2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), the Florida Supreme Court blessed “certain common liability
findings” from a class-wide trial and held that those findings must be given “res
judicata effect” in subsequent actions filed by individual class members. Id. at
1254. See also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013)
(clarifying the scope of the preclusive effect of the Engle findings).
63. In re Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294.
64. Id. at 1297 (“With all due respect for the district judge’s commendable
desire to experiment with an innovative procedure for streamlining the
adjudication of this ‘mass tort,’ we believe that his plan so far exceeds the
permissible bounds of discretion in the management of federal litigation as to
compel us to intervene and order decertification.”).
65. Id. at 1298. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1998)
(“An order granting certification . . . may force a defendant to settle rather than
incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous
liability.”). Several recent decisions have reiterated the view that the certification
of a litigation class can place significant pressure on defendants to settle. See
Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1206
(2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Certification of the class is often, if not usually, the
prelude to a substantial settlement by the defendant because the costs and risks of
litigating further are so high.”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740, 1752 (2011) (recognizing that class actions can entail a “risk of ‘in terrorem’
settlements”); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 F.3d 1004, 1007 (7th Cir.
2012) (noting that having “to face all [class members] in a single trial . . . could
produce a monstrous judgment” and that “[i]t is such threats of ruin that force
most defendants in class action suits to settle if a class is certified”).
66. In re Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1296.
67. Id. at 1298.
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about 25 cases that could total up to $125 million.68 But as a result
of the certification of an issues class and based on the assumption
that claims by 5,000 of the potential class members were not yet
barred by the applicable statutes of limitations—likely a
conservative estimate in light of the class action tolling doctrine—
the court suggested that the defendants might “easily be facing $25
billion in potential liability (conceivably more), and with it
bankruptcy.”69 The court balked at the implications of such an allor-nothing proposition and held that “it is not a waste of judicial
resources to conduct more than one trial, before more than six
jurors, to determine whether a major segment of the international
pharmaceutical industry is to follow the asbestos manufacturers into
Chapter 11.”70
A little more than one year after the Seventh Circuit issued its
decision in Rhone-Poulenc, a similarly ambitious issues-class
certification met the same fate in the Fifth Circuit for essentially
identical reasons. Castano involved a putative class of all nicotinedependent persons in the United States who purchased and smoked
cigarettes manufactured by the defendants since 1943.71 The
putative Rule 23(b)(3) class sought a variety of relief, including
compensatory and punitive damages “for the injury of nicotine
addiction.”72 The district court certified an issues class pursuant to
Rule 23(c)(4) for the issues of “core liability” and punitive
damages.73 Much like the district court in Rhone-Poulenc, the
district court in Castano contemplated an issues-class trial on certain
questions of liability to be followed by individualized damages
proceedings, assuming the jury returned a pro-plaintiff verdict in the
initial issues-class trial.74
This all-or-nothing approach on questions of liability caused the
Fifth Circuit serious concern. The court explained its discomfort by
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1300. The Seventh Circuit was also concerned about the district
court’s plan to instruct the issues-class jury with “a kind of Esperanto instruction,
merging the negligence standards of the 50 states and the District of Columbia,”
id., and the Seventh Amendment implications of the proposed bifurcation of
liability issues between different juries, id. at 1302–04.
71. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996).
72. Id. The plaintiffs’ theory of liability was that “defendants fraudulently
failed to inform consumers that nicotine is addictive and manipulated the level of
nicotine in cigarettes to sustain their addictive nature.” Id.
73. Id. at 739. The district court defined “core liability” issues as “‘common
factual issues [of] whether defendants knew cigarette smoking was addictive,
failed to inform cigarette smokers of such, and took actions to addict cigarette
smokers.’” Id. (quoting the district court).
74. Id. at 738.
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noting that “class certification creates insurmountable pressure on
defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not” because
“[t]he risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a
risk, even when the probability of an adverse judgment is low.”75
Consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s view, the Fifth Circuit held
that “[t]he collective wisdom of individual juries is necessary before
this court commits the fate of an entire industry or, indeed, the fate
of a class of millions, to a single jury.”76
Thus, whether resulting from the lack of class cohesion, the
existence of choice-of-law complexities, or judicial discomfort with
all-or-nothing trials, personal injury claims are no longer certified as
litigation classes. As Professor Nagareda explained, these
“constraints on class certification [have been] elaborated over
decades of real-world experience [and] are not hypertechnical
bugaboos.”77
Rather, they stem ultimately from a well-taken notion of
“preclusive symmetry”—an insistence that the plaintiff class
ought not to be positioned to wield the bargaining leverage
of a class-wide trial without, at the same time, affording to
the defendant the assurance of a commensurately binding
victory were the defendant, rather than the plaintiff class, to
prevail on the merits.78
In both Rhone-Poulenc and Castano, the courts expressed a
preference for diversified decisionmaking by multiple juries in mass
tort litigation.79 For example, given that personal injury claims are
75. Id. at 746.
76. Id. at 752.
77. Nagareda, supra note 5, at 1113.
78. Id. Professor Nagareda further elaborated on this concept as follows:
The reason why material differences in the content of applicable
substantive law or in the factual circumstances of class members matter
to class certification as a format for litigation . . . stems from the need,
absent settlement, to generate a judgment that will be issue preclusive on
the parties plus those capable of being bound as nonparties, like absent
class members. And issue preclusion turns upon actual litigation and
determination of the same legal or factual issue across the proceeding
said to yield such preclusive effect and the subsequent action to be
precluded. Material differences matter in practical terms because they
threaten to disable a [class-wide] trial from doing the essential thing that
it is supposed to do: resolve the disputed issues conclusively so as not to
allow the losing side to relitigate the issue later.
Id. at 1139 (footnotes omitted).
79. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995);
Castano, 84 F.3d at 752. I have previously argued that the “diversified
decisionmaking by legal communities around the country” that results from such
“parallel litigation” is not only consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s
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rarely small-value or negative-value claims that would be
outweighed by the expense of litigation, the Seventh Circuit thought
it was “entirely feasible to allow a final, authoritative determination
of [the defendants’] liability for the colossal misfortune that has
befallen the hemophiliac population to emerge from a decentralized
process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and different
standards of liability, in different jurisdictions.”80 Perhaps it should
not be surprising then that MDL and bellwether trials have emerged
to fill the procedural void left by the demise of personal injury
litigation classes.81
B. Contemporary Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation
In 1968, only two years after the extensive class action
amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Congress enacted the MDL statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407.82 Section
1407 allows related lawsuits pending in federal courts across the
country to be transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (JPML) to one judge for “coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings.”83 With the move away from personal injury
class actions, MDL consolidation is increasingly being relied upon
to aggregate the tens, hundreds, or thousands of related claims that
flood into the federal courts every time a discrete accident or event,
harmful substance or condition, or defective drug, device, or product

“fundamental principle of dual sovereignty” but will also “ultimately lead to better
law.” Grabill, supra note 5, at 324.
80. In re Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299. The Fifth Circuit similarly noted
that the claims of the putative class members were not “negative-value” suits.
Castano, 84 F.3d at 748 (recounting plaintiffs’ counsel’s promise to “inundate the
courts with individual claims if class certification is denied”).
81. See infra Part II.B.1. By combining “individual actions with some manner
of centralizing mechanism,” the emerging trends of multidistrict litigation and
bellwether trials are consistent with Professor Nagareda’s prescription for
“hybridization” in situations of “embedded aggregation” (i.e., “ostensibly
individual litigation” that has an “aggregate dimension”). Nagareda, supra note 5,
at 1108–14.
82. Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1407).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). See generally U.S. JUD. PANEL ON
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov (last visited Dec. 5, 2013).
Section 1407 was enacted largely in response to the difficulties created by two
waves of antitrust litigation in the 1950s and 1960s (the former involving the
motion picture industry and the latter electrical equipment manufacturers). See
Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a
Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 2245, 2258–66 (2008).
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is suspected of causing similar injuries to multiple people.84 And
although state court cases are not subject to federal MDL transfer, it
is increasingly common for MDL transferee courts to cooperate and
coordinate with state courts handling similar claims.85
The JPML consists of seven sitting federal judges designated by
the Chief Justice of the United States, and it holds public hearings
once every other month around the country to determine whether
MDL proceedings should be created for various collections of
similar claims.86 To carry out its statutory function, the JPML
engages in a two-step process when it is notified of potentially
related lawsuits. The JPML first “considers whether common
questions of fact among several pending civil actions exist such that
centralization of those actions in a single district will further the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and
efficient conduct of the actions.”87 If the JPML decides to create an
MDL proceeding, it then “considers which federal district and judge
are best situated to handle the transferred matters.”88

84. See, e.g., Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass
Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 962 (2012) (“[R]ecent years have
seen a rise in the use of coordinated multidistrict litigation to aggregate mass tort
claims.”).
85. See In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
2418, 2013 WL 565971, at *2 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 12, 2013) (identifying related state
court litigation and noting that the creation of a federal MDL “likely will facilitate
coordination among all courts with Plavix cases, simply because there will now be
only one federal judge handling most or all federal Plavix litigation”). See
generally Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and
State Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867 (2000). For
example, Professor McGovern was appointed as Special Master in the multidistrict
litigation arising from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and tasked with
assisting the transferee court, the parties, and counsel “in coordinating . . . with
other matters related to MDL-2179, including, but not limited to, matters in other
federal courts [and] matters in state courts.” See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D.
La. Oct. 7, 2010) (order appointing Professor McGovern as Special Master),
available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/10072010Order(App
ointSpecial Master).pdf. To achieve even greater aggregation of related claims and
reduce the need for such cross-jurisdictional cooperation and informal
coordination, Judge Weinstein has argued that “[i]t may be useful for Congress to
consider expanding the Class Action Fairness Act from class actions to at least
some national MDL, non-Rule 23, aggregate actions” because “[m]uch the same
concerns which animated CAFA’s preference for a single, federal forum [for class
actions] apply to national MDL aggregate actions.” In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d).
87. Heyburn, supra note 7, at 2228.
88. Id.
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1. Pretrial Management Techniques
MDL consolidation of related lawsuits does not merge the suits
into one massive case. Rather, MDL consolidation merely brings
related lawsuits before one judge so that they can be organized and
managed collectively to avoid the need to conduct duplicative
discovery. Nevertheless, the transferee court enjoys “broad”
authority that “necessarily encompasses issuing pretrial orders,
resolving pretrial motions (including discovery motions, motions to
amend, motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and
motions for class certification), and attempting to facilitate
settlement.”89
Following the creation of an MDL, the transferee court will
typically appoint plaintiffs’ and defendants’ liaison counsel to
manage the litigation and be the primary points of contact for the
court.90 In order to focus its attention on key legal issues presented
in the litigation, one of the first tasks that the transferee court may
assign to plaintiffs’ liaison counsel is to review the claims and
theories of liability set forth in the various individual cases that
comprise the MDL and compile one or more master complaints to
serve as the target for consolidated Rule 12 motion practice.91
For example, shortly after a multidistrict litigation proceeding
was created for the claims stemming from the BP Deepwater

89. Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 7, at 2328.
90. See id. at 2338 n.74 (explaining that liaison counsel “essentially serve as
the communication conduit between the transferee court and the thousands of
lawyers that can often be involved in any given MDL”); see also In re Oil Spill by
the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL
No. 2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010) (Pretrial Order No. 1) para. 16, available at
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/PTO1.pdf (discussing the duties of
liaison counsel and providing that such counsel “shall be authorized to receive
orders and notices from the Court on behalf of all parties within their liaison group
and shall be responsible for the preparation and transmittal of copies of such
orders and notices to the parties in their liaison group and perform other tasks
determined by the Court”).
91. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 453 (E.D. La. 2006)
(noting that “[m]aster complaints help the Court and the parties focus on common
issues in an efficient and effective manner”); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig.,
208 F.R.D. 133, 141 (E.D. La. 2002) (“Master complaints are often used in
complex litigation, although they are not specifically mentioned in either the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or in any federal statute.”). But see In re
Nuvaring Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-MD-1964, 2009 WL 2425391, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Aug. 6, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss master consolidated complaint
because that complaint was simply an “administrative tool to place in one
document all of the claims at issue in this litigation” and the court did not
contemplate Rule 12 motion practice “against the master complaint”).
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Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010,92 the transferee
court organized the claims into various “pleading bundles” for
purposes of “filing of complaints, answers and any Rule 12
motions.”93 The massive oil spill arose “from the April 20, 2010
explosion, fire, and sinking of the DEEPWATER HORIZON
mobile offshore drilling unit . . . which resulted in the release of
millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico before it was
finally capped approximately three months later.”94 Accordingly, the
pleading bundles were based on the types of claims being asserted
and/or the identity of the parties, for example:
• Bundle A—personal injury and wrongful death claims
involving individuals on the rig at the time of the explosion;
• Bundle B1—non-governmental economic loss and property
damage claims;
• Bundle B2—RICO claims;
• Bundle B3—claims by clean-up workers for personal
injuries or medical monitoring;
• Bundle B4—claims against vessels that responded to the
rig’s distress call;
• Bundle C—public damage claims by governmental entities;
• Bundle D1—claims against private parties seeking
injunctive relief; and
• Bundle D2—claims against governmental parties
challenging regulatory actions.95
In the pretrial order that created these bundles, the transferee
court also directed plaintiffs’ liaison counsel to file master
complaints in most bundles and established a schedule for Rule 12
motions.96 Approximately one year later, the transferee court had
resolved the Rule 12 motions that challenged the various master
complaints and was preparing to conduct its first trial on the claims
92. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (creating MDL
2179).
93. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010) (Pretrial Order
No. 11) para. III, available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders
/PTO11.pdf.
94. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex.,
on Apr. 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 (E.D. La. 2011).
95. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex.,
on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010) (Pretrial Order No. 11)
para. III, available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/PTO11.pdf.
96. Id. at paras. III–IV.

2014]

CLASS ACTION TOLLING IN MASS TORT MDL

459

that remained.97 On the eve of that trial, however, two putative class
action settlements were announced that held the promise of
resolving many of the private-party claims in the litigation.98 The
transferee court subsequently certified both settlement classes and
gave final approval to both settlement agreements.99
Following an initial round of motion practice focused on key
legal issues and to the extent that plaintiffs’ claims survive such
threshold scrutiny, MDL transferee courts are increasingly utilizing
bellwether trial plans, whereby several individual cases are selected
to proceed through full discovery and trial.100 Although the results
97. See In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943 (granting in part and denying in
part motions to dismiss the Bundle B1 master complaint); In re Oil Spill by the Oil
Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 792 F. Supp. 2d
926 (E.D. La. 2011) (granting motions to dismiss the Bundle D1 master
complaint), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 704 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Oil
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010,
802 F. Supp. 2d 725 (E.D. La. 2011) (granting motions to dismiss the Bundle B2
master complaint); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf
of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 4575696 (E.D. La. Sept. 30,
2011) (granting in part and denying in part motions to dismiss the Bundle B3
master complaint); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf
of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 4829905 (E.D. La. Oct. 12,
2011) (granting joint motion to dismiss the Bundle B4 cases), aff’d, 500 F. App’x
355 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the
Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 835 F. Supp. 2d 175 (E.D. La. 2011) (granting in
part and denying in part motions to dismiss certain Bundle C cases).
98. See Press Release, BP, BP Announces Settlement with PSC, Subject to
Final Written Agreement, to Resolve Economic Loss and Medical Claims from
Deepwater Horizon Accident and Oil Spill (Mar. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7073667.
99. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012) (certifying a
settlement class and granting final approval to the so-called Economic and
Property Damages Settlement Agreement); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179,
2013 WL 144042 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2013) (certifying a settlement class and
granting final approval to the so-called Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement). As this Article goes to press, various appeals are pending in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit regarding the transferee court’s certification
and approval of both settlement classes.
100. See Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 7, at 2325 (“A typical
bellwether case often begins as no more than an individual lawsuit that proceeds
through pretrial discovery and on to trial in the usual binary fashion: one plaintiff
versus one defendant. Such a case may take on ‘bellwether’ qualities, however,
when it is selected for trial because it involves facts, claims, or defenses that are
similar to the facts, claims, and defenses presented in a wider group of related
cases.”); see also Ashley Post, Yamaha and Merck Win High-Profile Bellwether
Trials, INSIDECOUNSEL (Feb. 1, 2012) (discussing the increasing use of bellwether
trials), available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/02/01/yamaha-andmerck-win-high-profile-bellwether-trial. Of course, “a transferee court cannot try
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of those trials are not binding on other individual plaintiffs within
the MDL, the “ultimate purpose of holding bellwether trials” is to
“provide meaningful information and experience to everyone
involved in the litigation[].”101 Indeed, “bellwether trials can
precipitate and inform settlement negotiations by indicating future
trends, that is, by providing guidance on how similar claims may
fare before subsequent juries.”102
After several years of intensive discovery, bellwether trials, and
authoritative rulings on key legal issues during which time the
applicable statutes of limitations should be running against
individuals who have not yet come forward to assert claims, the
statutory role of an MDL transferee court will often be largely
complete. In fact, § 1407 “obligates the [JPML] to remand any
pending case to its originating court when . . . pretrial proceedings
have run their course.”103 That said, “[f]ew cases are remanded for
trial; most multidistrict litigation is settled in the transferee court.”104
Nevertheless, it is the threat of remand—and the associated potential
chaos of dispersed litigation in federal courts across the country—
that often supplies the necessary impetus for the initiation of
settlement negotiations within the MDL context.
2. Modern Methods for Achieving Global Resolution
As I have previously described, “mass tort litigation is
increasingly resolved through non-class aggregate settlements”
known as “private mass tort settlements.”105 Notwithstanding this
emerging trend, however, class action settlements are still
occasionally used to settle mass tort litigation as well. It is important
to understand both settlement approaches to appreciate the harmful
effects that the class action tolling doctrine can have on efforts to
resolve contemporary mass tort litigation and how those effects can
be alleviated by MDL transferee courts.

cases transferred to it by the [JPML], unless the litigants consent to trial before the
transferee court.” Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 7, at 2354 (discussing the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)).
101. Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 7, at 2332.
102. Id. at 2338.
103. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 34.
104. Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151 (D.
Mass. 2006).
105. Grabill, supra note 10, at 123. Unlike proposed class action settlements,
private mass tort settlements are not subject to judicial review. Id. at 162–69.
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a. Private Mass Tort Settlements
Private mass tort settlements are non-class aggregate settlements
to which individual plaintiffs must affirmatively opt in.106 The two
most prominent examples of private mass tort settlements are the
2007 settlement of the Vioxx pharmaceutical MDL and the 2010
settlement of the World Trade Center Disaster Site litigation.107
For present purposes, the key distinguishing feature of private
mass tort settlements is that the settlement offer is made only to
current or eligible plaintiffs that have come forward in some fashion
to assert a claim by a negotiated deadline that usually either predates
or coincides with the date of the settlement announcement.108 Thus,
potential plaintiffs that have not identified themselves as of the
relevant cutoff date usually “miss the boat” in terms of being able to
participate in private mass tort settlements. This may, of course, be
unfortunate for those individuals, but it can have broader
consequences. As further discussed in Part III.C below, to the extent
that such potential plaintiffs have been sitting on the sideline
because their individual home states’ statutes of limitations have
been tolled by the class action tolling doctrine, the defendant(s)—
and the judiciary for that matter—will face the risk of a postsettlement wave of timely new claims. And depending on the
magnitude of that risk, it is even possible that the defendant(s) may
decide not to attempt a global settlement in the first place.
b. Class Action Settlements
As the Supreme Court explained in Amchem, a “settlement
class” is one that is “not intended to be litigated.”109 Accordingly,
“[s]ettlement is relevant to class certification,” and a court presented
with a request for certification of a settlement class “need not
inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable
106. Id. at 157–58.
107. Id. at 142–53.
108. Id. at 156–57. There are at least four other distinctive features of private
mass tort settlements:
(1) private mass tort settlements begin as a global settlement offer set
forth in a contract between plaintiffs’ liaison counsel and the
defendant(s); . . . [(2)] a requisite percentage of eligible plaintiffs must
individually opt in for the deal to become effective, but plaintiffs who
refuse to opt in are not bound by such settlements; [(3)] settlement
awards are based on detailed “points” matrices administered by claims
resolution facilities; [(4)] the entire settlement structure is transparent and
available for each plaintiff, and the public at large, to review.
Id. at 154.
109. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 601 (1997).
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management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be no
trial.”110 Moreover, “although variations in state laws applicable to
the claims of members of a putative multistate or nationwide
litigation class ordinarily preclude class certification, courts have
consistently held that such variations are no impediment to
certification of a class for settlement purposes only.”111 In short,
although “[t]he same analytical rigor is required for litigation and
settlement certification . . . some inquiries essential to litigation class
certification are no longer problematic in the settlement context.”112
Notwithstanding that the law on settlement classes is still
“evolving” and that “class settlement in mass tort cases (especially
personal injury claims) remains problematic,”113 the relaxation of
certain aspects of the Rule 23 analysis for settlement classes has
allowed several prominent mass tort cases to be settled as class
actions, including the Agent Orange,114 Breast Implants,115 and Fen110. Id. at 621. That said, “other specifications” of Rule 23, particularly those
“designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class
definitions,” “demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement
context” because “a court asked to certify a settlement class will lack the
opportunity, present when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the
proceedings as they unfold.” Id.
111. 2 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:3 (8th
ed. 2011) (collecting authorities). See also Varacallo v. Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 232 (D.N.J. 2005) (“Here, the case is not being certified
for litigation purposes, thus . . . predominance is not defeated by any differences in
the various laws of the fifty states.”).
112. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 335 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J.,
concurring).
113. Id. at 333–34 (Scirica, J., concurring). Perhaps the most important open
question is the degree to which the Supreme Court’s recent strengthening of Rule
23’s commonality requirement in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011), will apply in the settlement class context. See M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v.
Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that “the commonality test is no
longer met when the proposed class merely establishes that ‘there is at least one
issue whose resolution will affect all or a significant number of the putative class
members,’” but rather it now requires that all of the class members’ claims
“depend on a common issue of law or fact whose resolution ‘will resolve an issue
that is central to the validity of each one of the [class member’s] claims in one
stroke’” (quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551)).
114. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 163–67 (2d Cir.
1987) (affirming Judge Weinstein’s decision to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class action
given the centrality of the military contractor defense, notwithstanding the fact that
the issue of specific causation was “highly individualistic, and depend[ed] upon
the characteristics of individual plaintiffs (e.g. state of health, lifestyle) and the
nature of their exposure” and nevertheless recognizing that the Agent Orange
litigation “justifies the prevalent skepticism over the usefulness of class actions in
so-called mass tort cases”).
115. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 926, 1994
WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) settlement class

2014]

CLASS ACTION TOLLING IN MASS TORT MDL

463

Phen116 litigations. That relaxation may have also incentivized the
recent use of the class action device to settle the personal injury and
medical monitoring claims of individuals who were involved in
and/or exposed to the clean-up operations after the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill.117
III.

THE PESKY PERSISTENCE OF THE CLASS ACTION TOLLING
DOCTRINE

Despite the move away from personal injury litigation classes
and toward multidistrict litigation, bellwether trials, and private
mass tort settlements, the class action tolling doctrine is alive and
well in various jurisdictions across the country. The U.S. Supreme
Court first blessed the class action tolling doctrine in the antitrust
context almost 40 years ago,118 and since then the doctrine has
and approving a $4.25 billion class action settlement encompassing all people who
received implants from the settling defendants prior to June 1, 1993). The original
class action settlement in the Breast Implants litigation unraveled as a result of
unexpectedly large numbers of claimants applying to the settlement fund and Dow
Corning’s subsequent bankruptcy filing. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d
482, 486 (6th Cir. 1996).
116. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 1203, 99–20593, 2000 WL
1222042, at *41–42 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (certifying a nationwide settlement
class pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) because “use of the diet drugs
spanned a finite and relatively short period of time” and the drugs caused “a
common injury type to heart valves”).
117. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2013 WL 144042 (E.D. La. Jan. 11,
2013) (certifying a settlement class and granting final approval to the so-called
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement). It is worth noting here that
the order granting preliminary approval to the Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement explicitly
toll[ed] and stay[ed] the statutes of limitation applicable to any and all
claims or causes of action for Released Claims that have been or could be
asserted by or on behalf of any Medical Benefits Settlement Class
Members unless and until they Opt Out of the Medical Benefits
Settlement Class or the Medical Settlement Agreement is terminated
pursuant to Section XIV [of the settlement agreement].
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr.
20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. May 2, 2012) (preliminary approval order)
para. 32, available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/05022012
Order (MedicalSettlement).pdf. Although the class action tolling doctrine likely
rendered this provision in the preliminary approval order unnecessary, it is still
instructive because even if the transferee court had cut off class action tolling at
the inception of the MDL as proposed in this Article, some minimal period of
tolling may nevertheless be appropriate upon preliminary approval of a class
action settlement.
118. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
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expanded and been adopted by a variety of state courts as a matter of
state law. Indeed, although several courts have called into question
the continued application of the class action tolling doctrine in mass
tort litigation,119 the fact is that the filing of a putative personal
injury class action will still toll the applicable statutes of limitations
for potential personal injury plaintiffs in many jurisdictions and
thereby increase the amount of time such potential plaintiffs have to
come forward and assert their claims.120
A. American Pipe and Its Progeny
Prior to Rule 23’s amendment in 1966, a so-called “spurious”
class action could be maintained when “the character of the right
sought to be enforced for or against the class [was] . . . several, and
there [was] a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief [was] sought.”121 Unlike modern Rule
23(b)(3) class actions, spurious class actions were opt-in class
actions, such that “putative members of the class who chose not to
119. See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 1348, 2005 WL 26867,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2005) (noting that the “wisdom of adopting the American
Pipe rule in mass tort cases is, to say the least, highly debatable”); Bell v. Showa
Denko K.K., 899 S.W.2d 749, 758 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to “hold that the
filing of a mass personal injury suit, in a federal court, in another state, with the
variety of claims necessarily involved in such a case, entitled a plaintiff to a tolling
of the limitations period such as in American Pipe”); Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751
P.2d 923, 937 (Cal. 1988) (stating that plaintiffs “would be ill advised to rely on
the mere filing of a class action complaint to toll their individual statute of
limitations”); see also, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 897,
907 n.3 (E.D. La. 2007) (rejecting defendant’s request not to apply American Pipe
tolling and instead holding that “until such a uniform rule prohibiting certification
of personal injury class actions is announced, the Court will faithfully apply
American Pipe”).
120. Of course, the plaintiff that seeks to rely on a previously filed putative
class action for tolling purposes must fit within that putative class action’s class
definition. See, e.g., Knollenberg v. Wyeth, No. 2:05-CV-2044, 2011 WL
5358698 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 7, 2011) (refusing to toll the two-year statute of
limitations on plaintiff’s claims because she fell outside the class definition set
forth in the previously filed putative class action). It is also worth noting that “a
majority of the federal Courts of Appeals . . . have denied tolling in the successive
class action context,” that is, when “absent class members . . . seek to press their
claims in the context of a successive class action initiated by a new class
representative.” Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule
and Successive Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV. 803, 806–07 (2006). In other
words, after certification is denied, putative members of a previously filed putative
class action must generally come forward individually—not as part of a new
putative class action—in order to enjoy the benefits of class action tolling.
121. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 545 (quoting the pre-amendment version of FED. R.
CIV. P. 23).
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intervene or join as parties would not be bound by the judgment.”122
As the Supreme Court explained, “A recurrent source of abuse
under the former Rule lay in the potential that members of the
claimed class could in some situations await developments in the
trial or even final judgment on the merits in order to determine
whether participation would be favorable to their interests.”123 When
Rule 23 was amended in 1966, there existed a conflict among the
federal courts of appeals concerning whether the filing of a putative
spurious class action tolled the applicable statutes of limitations for
putative class members—to be more precise, the tolling issue at that
time was framed as “whether parties should be allowed to join or
intervene as members of a ‘spurious’ class after the termination of
[their own] limitation period, when the initial class action complaint
had been filed before the applicable statute of limitations period had
run.”124
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the Supreme
Court finally addressed this question but did so through the looking
glass of the amended version of Rule 23.125 And, indeed, the
Supreme Court viewed the revisions to Rule 23 as dispositive of the
tolling issue:
Whatever the merit in the conclusion that one seeking to join
a class after the running of the statutory period asserts a
“separate cause of action” which must individually meet the
timeliness requirements, such a concept is simply
inconsistent with Rule 23 as presently drafted. A federal
class action is no longer “an invitation to joinder” but a truly
representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage,
unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions.126
Thus, the Court held that “the commencement of the original class
suit tolls the running of the statute [of limitations] for all purported
members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after
the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status.”127
122. Id. at 547.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 549–50 nn.18–19 (collecting authorities).
125. For a detailed discussion of the factual background in American Pipe, see
Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 21, at 538–41.
126. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550. The Supreme Court noted that the 1966
amendments “were designed, in part, specifically to mend [the] perceived defect in
the former Rule and to assure that members of the class would be identified before
trial on the merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and judgments.”
Id. at 547.
127. Id. at 553. Notably, the Supreme Court limited its holding to the unique
posture of the case before it, namely “where class action status ha[d] been denied
solely because of failure to demonstrate that ‘the class is so numerous that joinder
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Of course, in mass tort MDLs today, the question is not usually
one of intervention but rather whether purported members of a
putative class that is denied class action status should be allowed to
subsequently file separate lawsuits if their individual limitations
periods would have expired without the benefit of tolling. In 1983,
the Supreme Court expanded upon American Pipe to shed light on
this related issue (albeit not in the MDL context) in Crown, Cork &
Seal Co. v. Parker.128 The American Pipe decision had concluded
with broad language that could be read to apply beyond the context
of intervention: “[T]he commencement of a class action suspends
the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the
class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to
continue as a class action.”129 In Crown, Cork & Seal, the Court
reaffirmed this language and held that once the applicable statutes of
limitations have been tolled by the filing of a putative class action,
they “remain[] tolled for all members of the putative class until class
certification is denied. At that point, class members may choose to
file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending
action.”130

of all members is impracticable’” but “common issues of law and fact respecting
the underlying conspiracy” were nonetheless probable. Id. at 552–53 (quoting
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)). Today, those original limiting conditions have largely
been forgotten.
128. 462 U.S. 345 (1983). As with the antitrust claim at issue in American
Pipe, the racial discrimination claim at issue in Crown, Cork & Seal arose under
federal law. For further details concerning the factual background in Crown, Cork
& Seal, see Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 21, at 541–43.
129. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554.
130. Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 354. At least as a matter of federal
decisional law, this rule only applies with respect to the first putative class action
that is filed; putative class members cannot “stack” or “piggyback” subsequent
class actions to extend the tolling period. See Basch v. Ground Round, Inc., 139
F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Plaintiffs may not stack one class action on top of
another and continue to toll the statute of limitations indefinitely.”); SalazarCalderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Ass’n, 765 F.2d 1334, 1350 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“Plaintiffs have no authority for their contention that putative class members may
piggyback one class action onto another and thus toll the statute of limitations
indefinitely, nor have we found any.”). Moreover, when an individual chooses to
file his or her own lawsuit before the class certification issue has been resolved in
the putative class action relied upon for tolling purposes, some courts have held
that such an individual is not entitled to any tolling benefit at all. See, e.g., In re
Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 497 F.3d 1005, 1025–27 (9th Cir. 2007);
Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 566–69 (6th Cir. 2005);
Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 739 (1st Cir. 1983). But see Caleb Brown,
Note, Piped In: The Tenth Circuit Weighs In on Extending American Pipe Tolling
in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Boellstorff, 62 OKLA. L. REV.
793, 800–09 (2010) (discussing conflicting holdings on this issue and arguing that
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B. Class Action Tolling in Personal Injury Litigation
Both American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal addressed
whether limitations periods for asserting federal causes of action had
been tolled by the filing of putative class actions in federal court.131
In putative personal injury class actions, however, state law will
supply the rules of decision and the applicable statutes of
limitations—even though such cases are increasingly being
aggregated in federal court via the MDL statute.132 Although there
has been some debate about whether the tolling doctrine announced
by the Supreme Court in American Pipe should be limited to federal
causes of action or instead apply broadly to any class action filed in
federal court,133 most courts now agree that “a federal court
evaluating the timeliness of state law claims must look to the law of
the relevant state to determine whether, and to what extent, the
statute of limitations should be tolled by the filing of a putative class
action in another jurisdiction.”134 In mass tort MDLs that may
contain claims by individual plaintiffs from all 50 states, the most

“American Pipe tolling should be extended to cover independent suits filed prior
to class certification”).
131. See supra notes 125, 128.
132. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
133. See Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 21, at 545–68. For example, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has interpreted the tolling rule of
American Pipe as a principle of federal common law that applies by its own force
in federal court (including in diversity cases) regardless of the applicable state law
on tolling. See In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 391 F.3d 907,
915 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he federal interest in ‘the efficiency and economy of the
class-action procedure’ outweighs any state interest and therefore justifies tolling
in diversity cases where the otherwise-applicable state law provides no relief.”)
(quoting Adams Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Asbestos Corp., 7 F.3d 717, 718–19 (8th Cir.
1993)).
134. Casey v. Merck & Co., Inc., 653 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that
“the majority of our sister courts that have addressed the issue” have reached this
conclusion). See also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 897, 907
(E.D. La. 2007) (“In diversity cases, where state law provides the rules of
decision, ‘a federal court should apply not only state statutes of limitations but also
any accompanying tolling rules.’ Indeed, it has been recognized that American
Pipe does not apply by its own force in diversity cases.” (quoting Vaught v.
Showa Denko K.K., 107 F.3d 1137, 1145 (5th Cir. 1997))); Orleans Parish Sch.
Bd. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 892 F. Supp. 794, 805 (E.D. La. 1995) (“The limitations
periods of American Pipe and Crown, Cork were derived from federal statutes.
Here we are dealing with Hawaii’s limitation statutes. Because none of them
provide for tolling in a situation such as exists here, it is doubtful that either
American Pipe or Crown, Cork can be treated as applicable precedent.”).
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obvious impact of the majority view is that it exponentially
complicates the tolling inquiry for transferee courts.135
Looking to state law then, one finds that many states have
adopted class action tolling as a matter of state law, often offering
no other justification for doing so beyond those annunciated by the
Supreme Court in American Pipe.136 That said, some states have not
adopted class action tolling,137 and states often take different views
with respect to “cross-jurisdictional” class action tolling—that is,
whether a class action filed in federal court or in a different state’s
court system tolls the statute of limitations for an individual that
subsequently files suit in state court in the forum state.138
135. See, e.g., In re Vioxx, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (“Given that this MDL
currently contains cases transferred from every State in the Union, and that federal
jurisdiction in these cases is premised on diversity of citizenship, the Court could
conceivably be faced with the task of applying each state’s statute of limitations in
this multidistrict litigation.”).
136. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 905 A.2d 340, 355 (Md.
Ct. App. 2006) (“We adopt the American Pipe class action tolling rule, and its
extension in Crown, Cork & Seal.”); Ling v. Webb, 834 N.E.2d 1137, 1141–42
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (relying on American Pipe to conclude that “the
commencement of a class action lawsuit tolls the applicable statute of limitations
during the period between the filing of the action and the trial court’s ruling on the
question of class certification”); Am. Tierra Corp. v. City of W. Jordan, 840 P.2d
757, 762 (Utah 1992) (adopting class action tolling “to avoid duplication of
litigation, promote justice, do equity, and generally further the judicial efficiency
and economy that class actions are designed to promote”); Grant v. Austin Bridge
Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (relying on American Pipe
and Crown, Cork & Seal to hold that “the filing of the class action suspends the
applicable statute of limitations as [to] all purported members of the class”); White
v. Sims, 470 So. 2d 1191, 1193 (Ala. 1985) (“[W]e hold that the commencement
of a class action tolls the statute of limitations until such time as an independent
action is filed, or until the denial of class certification, whichever may first
occur.”); see also, e.g., Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 286–87 (4th Cir.
1999) (collecting authorities); Staub v. Eastman Kodak Co., 726 A.2d 955, 963–
64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (collecting authorities).
137. See Wade, 182 F.3d at 287 (noting that Virginia has not adopted the class
action tolling doctrine); Highland Park Ass’n of Bus. & Enters. v. Abramson, 91
F.3d 143 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (recognizing that Kentucky
has never adopted the American Pipe doctrine).
138. Compare Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 160
(Ohio 2002) (allowing a putative class action filed in federal court to toll the
statute of limitations for a plaintiff that subsequently filed an individual lawsuit in
Ohio state court), with Quinn v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp., 118 So. 3d
1011, 1020 (La. 2012) (holding that “the suspension of prescription” provided by
Article 596 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure “applies only to petitions
brought on behalf of a class in the state courts of Louisiana”) (internal quotation
omitted), Casey v. Merck & Co., Inc., 722 S.E.2d 842, 845 (Va. 2012) (“[T]here is
no authority in Virginia jurisprudence for the equitable tolling of a statute of
limitations based upon the pendency of a putative class action in another
jurisdiction.”), Ravitch v. Pricewaterhouse, 793 A.2d 939, 945 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2014]

CLASS ACTION TOLLING IN MASS TORT MDL

469

Moreover, tolling itself operates in different ways in different
states and it is well established that “when federal courts look to
state law to provide the limitations period, they must also do so to
determine the effect on that limitations period once class
certification has been denied.”139 Therefore, if an MDL transferee
court determines that the applicable state law recognizes class action
tolling, the court must then also determine how that tolling actually
functions. Under state law, “[t]hree general tolling effects are
possible: 1) suspension, 2) extension, and 3) renewal or revival.”140
Under suspension, the plaintiff must file suit within the
amount of time left in the limitation period on the day tolling
took place. . . . The extension rule establishes fixed periods
during which the plaintiff may file suit without regard to the
length of the original limitation period or the amount of time
left when the tolling began. . . . [Finally,] tolling may renew
or revive the limitation period, giving the plaintiff the benefit
of an entirely fresh time period.141
Although a detailed discussion of these various tolling effects is
beyond the scope of this Article, the important points are that (1)
state law governs tolling in personal injury cases and (2) that body
of law consists of a complicated patchwork of tolling principles that
differ from state to state. In short, MDL transferee courts must
recognize that class action tolling is alive and well as a matter of

2002) (holding that “the filing of a class action in another state does not toll the
statute of limitations as to a subsequent action filed in Pennsylvania’s state court
system”), Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 805, 807–08 (Tenn.
2000) (noting that Tennessee will not toll its statutes of limitations “pending a
judicial outcome in a foreign jurisdiction”), and Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 701
N.E.2d 1102, 1103–05 (Ill. 1998) (rejecting cross-jurisdictional class action
tolling). For a broad overview of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, see
generally David Bober, Cross-Jurisdictional Tolling: When and Whether a State
Court Should Toll Its Statute of Limitations Based on the Filing of a Class Action
in Another Jurisdiction, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 617 (2002).
139. Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 21, at 544 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s holding in Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983)).
140. Kathleen L. Cerveny, Note, Limitation Tolling When Class Status Denied:
Chardon v. Fumero Soto and Alice in Wonderland, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 686,
689 (1985).
141. Id. at 689–90 (internal citations omitted). See also Barasich v. Shell
Pipeline Co., No. 05-4180, 2008 WL 6468611, at *6 n.7 (E.D. La. June 19, 2008)
(recognizing that “[t]he denial of class certification has the effect of re-starting the
running of prescription, and at this point, putative class members may choose to
file their own suits, provided that those actions are instituted within the time that
remains on the limitations period, or may elect to intervene as plaintiffs in the
pending action”).
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state law in various jurisdictions and should take steps to ensure that
the class action tolling doctrine does not frustrate the fair and
efficient resolution of modern mass tort litigation.
C. Class Action Tolling Can Undermine Efforts to Resolve Mass
Tort Litigation
Although some states have established specialized statutes of
limitations for specified causes of action (such as medical
malpractice claims and wrongful death claims), most states utilize
one-, two-, or three-year statutes of limitations for personal injury
claims,142 though a few states employ longer limitations periods for
such claims.143 As the Supreme Court explained long ago, “such
statutes ‘promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival
of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.’”144
Thus, statutes of limitations are premised on the idea “that even if
one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to
defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of
stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute
them.”145 Class action tolling obviously frustrates this basic policy.
142. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (2011) (establishing one-year
prescriptive period for personal injury and wrongful death claims); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 28-3-104 (Westlaw 2013) (establishing one-year limitations period for
personal injury claims premised on theories of negligence and strict liability); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(1)(a) (Westlaw 2013) (establishing one-year
limitations period for personal injury claims); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524(2)
(Westlaw 2013) (establishing two-year limitations period for personal injury and
wrongful death claims); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-202 (West 2011)
(establishing two-year limitations period for personal injury claims); ALA. CODE §
6-2-38 (Westlaw 2013) (establishing two-year limitations period for personal
injury claims); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (West 2002)
(establishing two-year limitations period for personal injury claims); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 335.1 (West 2006) (establishing two-year limitations period for
personal injury and wrongful death claims); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-2 (Westlaw
2013) (establishing two-year limitations period for personal injury claims).
143. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(a) (Westlaw 2013) (establishing
four-year limitations period for personal injury claims founded on negligence);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 516.120(4) (Westlaw 2013) (establishing five-year limitations
period for personal injury claims); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01-16(5)
(Westlaw 2013) (establishing six-year limitations period for personal injury
claims); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (Westlaw 2013) (establishing a
general six-year limitations period for all civil actions).
144. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (quoting Order
of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944)).
145. Id. (quoting Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 348–49); see also Wasserman,
supra note 120, at 811–12 (discussing other interests that statutes of limitations
serve).
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In both American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal, the Supreme
Court was concerned that its failure to adopt a class action tolling
rule would lead to a “needless multiplicity of actions”146 and would
“deprive Rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of
litigation which is a principal purpose of the [class action]
procedure.”147 In short, the Court’s tolling rule was premised on the
view that the class action device might obviate the need for
individualized litigation—Thus, until class certification was denied,
individuals were encouraged to sit tight and not burden the courts
with “unnecessary filing of repetitious papers.”148 But with the
demise of personal injury litigation classes in the wake of Amchem
and the emergence of multidistrict litigation, bellwether trials, and
private mass tort settlements (not to mention electronic filing of
court documents), the justification for class action tolling relied
upon by the Supreme Court in 1974 has vanished in the personal
injury context. Today, class action tolling for putative members of
putative personal injury class actions actually threatens to
undermine the laudable goal of “litigative efficiency.”149
In contemporary mass tort litigation, requiring personal injury
claimants to come forward individually in a timely fashion is not
inefficient. At worst, if such plaintiffs file cases in local courts
around the country, the JPML must order them transferred to the
federal MDL forum as “tag-along” actions and the transferee court’s
clerk’s office will be required to create new dockets for each
individual case that comes into the MDL.150 Alternatively, the
transferee court (with the agreement of the defendant(s)) may allow
individual plaintiffs to file cases directly into the federal MDL,
regardless of venue constraints.151 Direct filing into an MDL
“avoids the expense and delay associated with plaintiffs filing in
146. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 351 (1983).
147. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974).
148. Id. at 550.
149. Id. at 556.
150. See Heyburn, supra note 7, at 2233 n.41 (“Panel Rule 1.1 defines tagalong action as ‘a civil action pending in a district court and involving common
questions of fact with actions previously transferred under Section 1407.’”).
151. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903–04 (E.D.
La. 2007) (discussing a pretrial order that recognized the defendant’s agreement
not to assert “any objection of improper venue” as to “cases filed directly in the
Eastern District of Louisiana that emanate from districts outside the Eastern
District of Louisiana”); see also In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater
Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Dec.
17, 2010) (Pretrial Order No. 20), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov
/OilSpill/Orders/PTO20.pdf (authorizing direct filing “to eliminate the delays
associated with transfer of cases filed in or removed to other U.S. District Courts,
and to promote judicial efficiency”).
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local federal courts around the country after the creation of an MDL
and waiting for the [JPML] to transfer these ‘tag-a-long’ actions” to
the transferee court.152 Or defendants may be willing to enter into
tolling agreements with individual plaintiffs that eliminate the need
for such plaintiffs to file lawsuits altogether.153 The key point is that,
whichever method is utilized, requiring individual plaintiffs to come
forward does not burden the transferee judge or create inefficiencies
in modern practice.
Moreover, this “multiplicity of actions” is essentially a
prerequisite to the successful implementation of aggregate non-class
settlements, which themselves are becoming increasingly
ubiquitous.154 As previously explained, “private mass tort
settlements are only open to ‘eligible’ plaintiffs—that is, plaintiffs
with pending claims as of a date certain, often the date on which the
initial contract between plaintiffs’ liaison counsel and the
defendant(s) is announced.”155 It is perhaps obvious, but in order to
make an appropriate aggregate settlement offer, the defendant needs
to know approximately how many plaintiffs are asserting claims
(and will therefore be dividing the aggregate settlement fund).
Similarly, in order to be comfortable with making an aggregate
settlement offer in the first place, most defendants will insist on
some degree of certainty regarding the likelihood of future claims
being filed after the settlement is announced.
For example, in the Vioxx pharmaceutical MDL, Merck first
filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a definitive ruling on
the applicability of American Pipe tolling on September 22, 2006—
several months before the transferee court and several coordinating
state court judges suggested that the parties begin settlement
discussions. The transferee court denied Merck’s motion on March
22, 2007, in light of the “existence of factual disputes regarding both
the triggering and tolling of the various limitations periods.”156
Seven months later, in late October 2007, Merck filed three
additional motions for summary judgment again seeking guidance
concerning whether various states’ statutes of limitations would be
found to have run out or instead been tolled by the class action
tolling doctrine. In subsequent hearings and conferences, Merck’s
152. In re Vioxx, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
153. “For example, in the Vioxx litigation, thousands of individuals had entered
into ‘tolling agreements’ with Merck which tolled the statute of limitations and
allowed individual claims to be ‘on file’ with the defendant without requiring
plaintiffs to file an actual lawsuit, and those individuals were eligible to participate
in the Vioxx Settlement.” Grabill, supra note 10, at 156.
154. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
155. Grabill, supra note 10, at 156.
156. In re Vioxx, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
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counsel left no doubt that such guidance was critical to Merck’s
settlement calculus. On November 8, 2007, recognizing that “the
litigation [had] matured,” the transferee court resolved Merck’s
renewed motions and held that various statutes of limitations had
expired; in doing so, the court made clear that it would take a
circumscribed approach to class action tolling—only applying the
doctrine in limited circumstances that had been specifically
authorized by the applicable state courts.157 One day later, on
November 9, 2007, the landmark $4.85 billion private mass tort
settlement in the Vioxx litigation was publicly announced.
Private mass tort settlements tend to occur after several years of
litigation, during which time the applicable statutes of limitations
should be running on potential claimants, such that defendants can
theoretically take comfort in knowing in which states the door is
“closed” before announcing a settlement offer. But class action
tolling allows potential claimants who would otherwise have waited
too long to file suit an extended period of time to come forward and
thereby prevents defendants from having any such comfort.158 In an
era where litigation classes are no longer certified, the resulting
uncertainty about the scope of a defendant’s future liability cannot
be justified and is likely to either delay or completely frustrate
settlement efforts.
IV. MDL TRANSFEREE COURTS SHOULD SHORT-CIRCUIT THE CLASS
ACTION TOLLING DOCTRINE
All is not lost, however, and MDL transferee courts need not
wait for the Supreme Court and/or state courts of last resort to revisit
their class action tolling holdings. Instead, by expeditiously issuing a
short pretrial order that relies on the national trend rejecting
certification of personal injury litigation classes,159 transferee courts
can short-circuit the class action tolling doctrine and maximize the
chances for a fair and efficient resolution of mass tort multidistrict
litigation without limiting the settlement approaches that can be
157. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 799, 801 (E.D. La.
2007) (noting that “[i]t is now clear that the factual disputes identified by the
plaintiffs regarding when they knew or could have been put on notice of potential
claims against Merck are baseless disputes”); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2007
WL 3353404 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2007); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2007 WL
3334339 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2007).
158. See, e.g., Cerveny, supra note 140, at 704 (“In effect, the filing of an
ineffective class action exposes the defendant to a universe of claimants beyond
the presumed reasonable time period provided under the original statute of
limitations.”).
159. See supra notes 3–4; see also supra Part II.A.
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employed once the litigation has matured. This Part begins by
offering a proposed structure for such an “omnibus class action
pretrial order” and explains why this type of order will not have
collateral estoppel effect on a subsequent request for certification of
one or more settlement classes. The Part then concludes by
discussing several associated issues that may arise under the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA) in connection with the issuance of an
omnibus class action pretrial order.160
A. Omnibus Denial of Class Action Status for Putative Litigation
Classes
In light of the persistence of the class action tolling doctrine, the
common-sense triage approach of transferee courts to defer
consideration of class action issues in mass tort MDLs carries the
unintended consequence of possibly delaying or completely
preventing a successful resolution of such litigations by injecting
uncertainty about both the current and future plaintiff populations.
Accordingly, transferee courts should reexamine their current
tendency to defer consideration of class action issues in mass tort
MDLs and instead issue an omnibus class action pretrial order at the
inception of any MDL that contains at least one putative personal
injury class action. That omnibus order should do at least four
things: (i) strike all current and future personal injury class
allegations from all current and future complaints in the MDL; (ii)
deny all current and future requests for personal injury claims to be
certified as litigation classes; (iii) explicitly provide that the purpose
of the order is to suspend any and all tolling of the applicable
statute(s) of limitations that might otherwise occur as a result of the
class action tolling doctrine; and (iv) make clear that the parties are
not precluded from subsequently seeking certification of one or
more settlement classes.
Although an omnibus class action pretrial order could be crafted
in many different ways to accomplish these central purposes, some
exemplary language is set forth below by way of illustration:
This Order shall govern all cases (1) transferred to this
Court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(“JPML”) pursuant to its Order of [insert date of initial
JPML Order creating the MDL proceeding]; (2) any tag160. Given that putative single-state class actions may remain in state court
under CAFA’s exceptions, see infra note 172, state courts should also strive to
strike personal injury class allegations as soon as possible after such allegations
are filed and/or otherwise deny class action status to putative personal injury class
actions in an expeditious fashion.
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along actions subsequently transferred to this Court by the
JPML pursuant to Rule 7.4 of the Rules of Procedure of that
Panel; and (3) all related cases originally filed in this Court
or otherwise transferred or removed to this Court.
To facilitate the efficient and effective management and
prosecution of the coordinated actions in this MDL and to
minimize any potentially harmful impacts of the class action
tolling doctrine,
(i) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, in light of the
overwhelming weight of authority rejecting the certification
of personal injury claims as class actions for purposes of
adjudication pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, (a) paragraphs of
the complaint in [insert paragraph references and case
captions for any complaints filed in cases currently in the
MDL that contain personal injury class action allegations]
which contain personal injury class action allegations, are
hereby STRICKEN and (b) any similar paragraphs
containing personal injury class action allegations in
complaints in any tag-along actions subsequently transferred
to this Court by the JPML pursuant to Rule 7.4 of the Rules
of Procedure of that Panel or any related cases that are
subsequently originally filed in this Court or otherwise
transferred or removed to this Court are DEEMED
STRICKEN by operation of this Order as of the date that
such tag-along actions or related cases join this MDL.
(ii) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of the
overwhelming weight of authority rejecting the certification
of personal injury claims as class actions for purposes of
adjudication pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, (a) the requests
for class certification contained in [insert references to any
pending motions in cases currently in the MDL for
certification of personal injury claims as litigation classes,
regardless of whether those motions were filed before or
after the cases joined the MDL] are DENIED, (b) any
similar motions for certification of personal injury claims as
litigation classes that may be filed in this Court in the future
in any tag-along actions subsequently transferred to this
Court by the JPML pursuant to Rule 7.4 of the Rules of
Procedure of that Panel or any related cases that are
subsequently originally filed in this Court or otherwise
transferred or removed to this Court are DEEMED DENIED
by operation of this Order as of the date that such motions
are filed, and (c) any similar motions for certification of
personal injury claims as litigation classes that are, or may
already have been, filed in any tag-along actions
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subsequently transferred to this Court by the JPML pursuant
to Rule 7.4 of the Rules of Procedure of that Panel or any
related cases that are subsequently originally filed in this
Court or otherwise transferred or removed to this Court prior
to any such tag-along actions or related cases joining this
MDL are DEEMED DENIED by operation of this Order as
of the date that such tag-along actions or related cases join
this MDL.
(iii) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order does
not preclude any party from subsequently seeking
certification of one or more settlement classes pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
The provisions of this Order are provisional and may be
modified in the interests of justice, expedience, or judicial
economy on the Court’s own motion or upon motion by any
party for good cause shown.
Prior to issuing an omnibus class action pretrial order along
these lines, the transferee court should consider asking liaison
counsel to review the complaints and dockets in all cases that
comprise the MDL (including all pending cases that were
transferred by the JPML to the transferee court in the JPML’s initial
order creating the MDL and all pending cases that were originally
filed in or otherwise transferred or removed to the transferee court)
to ensure both that (i) any paragraphs in those complaints containing
personal injury class action allegations and (ii) any motions for class
certification that may have been filed in any such cases are
referenced in the applicable provisions of the omnibus class action
pretrial order. Of course, in addition to relying on liaison counsel,
the transferee court may also wish to conduct its own review of
these materials prior to issuing an omnibus class action pretrial
order.
Although the omnibus class action pretrial order proposed above
could be entered by transferee courts sua sponte, MDL defendants
would be well advised to make a habit of requesting such relief to
ensure that the pendency of personal injury class allegations is
immediately brought to the attention of transferee courts.161 Notably,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that the
fact that a “motion to strike came before the plaintiffs had filed a
motion to certify the class does not by itself make the court’s
161. See Barasich v. Shell Pipeline Co., No. 05-4180, 2008 WL 6468611, at *2
(E.D. La. June 19, 2008) (noting that courts “may dismiss class allegations via a
motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and/or via a motion to
strike under Rule 12(f)”).
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decision reversibly premature.”162 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recognized that although class certification issues generally involve
“considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues
comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action . . . [s]ometimes the issues
are plain enough from the pleadings.”163 Today, based on a long line
of well-reasoned precedent, it is “plain enough” that personal injury
claims cannot be certified as litigation classes.
B. Parties Can Subsequently Seek Certification of Settlement
Classes
Given that mass tort litigation continues to occasionally be
resolved via class action settlements, MDL transferee courts must be
careful not to prematurely cut off the parties’ ability to use the class
action device to achieve global resolution if it is desired and
appropriate. Provided that it is structured properly, however, the
omnibus class action pretrial order proposed above will not have
preclusive effect nor prevent the parties from seeking certification of
(or the court from certifying) a subsequent settlement class for two
reasons.164
First, as an initial matter, Rule 23(c)(1)(C) provides that “[a]n
order that grants or denies class certification may be altered or
amended before final judgment.”165 Thus, it has been argued that “as
162. Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 2011)
(affirming district court order granting defendants’ motion to strike class action
allegations). See also Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 941
(9th Cir. 2009) (“A defendant may move to deny class certification before a
plaintiff files a motion to certify a class.”); Salvant v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No.
06-8700, 2007 WL 2344912 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2007) (granting defendant’s Rule
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs’ request for certification
of a personal injury class action in a case alleging exposure to sulfur dioxide
fumes released from an oil refinery).
163. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
164. Issue preclusion prevents “successive litigation of an issue of fact or law
actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior
judgment, whether or not the issue arises on the same or a different claim.” New
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748–49 (2001). Typically, “[i]t is the duty of
the second trial court—which knows both what the earlier finding was and how it
relates to a later case—to independently determine what preclusive effect a prior
judgment may be given.” Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 576 F. Supp. 2d
1328, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2008). Of course, in MDL proceedings, the transferee court
will likely issue the initial omnibus class action pretrial order and subsequently
determine its preclusive effect.
165. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C). See also Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.
Ct. 1426, 1437 n.7 (2013) (Ginsburg, J. and Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A]
certification order may be altered or amended as the case unfolds.”); Falcon, 457
U.S. at 160 (“[E]ven after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to
modify it in the light of subsequent developments in the litigation.”); Coopers &
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a nonfinal decision that can be reviewed at any time during the
proceeding, [such an order] cannot be afforded the ‘definiteness’ of
preclusion.”166 Second, even if the omnibus class action pretrial
order could be considered final, it would have no preclusive effect
on later efforts to certify a settlement class because the Rule 23
inquiry for settlement classes differs from the inquiry for litigation
classes.167
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Smith v. Bayer is
instructive on this point and leaves no doubt that an omnibus class
action pretrial order crafted along the lines proposed above would
not prevent the subsequent certification of a settlement class.168 In
Smith, the Supreme Court held that a federal court’s denial of class
certification under Rule 23 does not preclude the same putative
plaintiff class from subsequently seeking certification in state court
under a state-law analog of Rule 23 (provided that the state-law
analog is not identical to Rule 23).169 Given that the Rule 23
analysis is different for litigation and settlement classes, the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Smith suggests that an order denying
certification of a litigation class would not prevent the exact same
putative class from later seeking certification of a settlement class.
Thus, regardless of the increasing rarity of class action settlements
in mass tort litigation, MDL transferee courts can issue an omnibus
class action pretrial order without prematurely cutting off the
parties’ subsequent ability to seek to use the class action device to
implement a global settlement.
C. CAFA Considerations
As noted above, there is a general prohibition against “stacking”
class actions for purposes of tolling.170 In other words, it is typically
only the first putative class action that is filed that can toll the
applicable statute(s) of limitations for putative members of that
class—Any subsequent related putative class actions that are filed
are generally irrelevant for purposes of tolling. Therefore, it is at
least theoretically possible that the operative putative class action for
tolling purposes in any given MDL (i.e., the first such case to be
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.11 (1978) (“[A] district court’s order
denying or granting class status is inherently tentative.”).
166. Antonio Gidi, Issue Preclusion Effect of Class Certification Orders, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1036 (2012).
167. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
168. 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
169. Id. at 2382.
170. See supra note 130.
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filed) may remain in state court for jurisdictional reasons and not be
subject to the omnibus class action pretrial order proposed above.
However, CAFA has largely minimized the potential harm
associated with this theoretical possibility.
CAFA’s expanded minimal diversity provisions ensure that
most multistate and nationwide putative class actions are now
removable to federal court and, thus, subject to MDL
consolidation.171 In very general terms, the only putative class
actions likely to remain in state court in the mass tort context postCAFA are single-state class actions—that is, putative classes
defined to include only individuals from the forum state.172 Thus, in
the post-CAFA world, it is extremely unlikely for any putative class
action with the potential to toll the applicable statutes of limitations
for mass tort plaintiffs from multiple states to remain in state court.
Rather, the more likely scenario is that, for a given mass tort,
plaintiffs from several states may enjoy the benefits of tolling by
virtue of the filing of a single-state putative class action in their
home state that is not removable under CAFA—provided, of course,
that the relevant state courts do not immediately strike such personal
injury class allegations or otherwise expeditiously deny class action
status to those cases.173
171. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2006) (expanding diversity jurisdiction to
putative class actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and
“any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant”). CAFA also expands diversity jurisdiction to “mass actions,” which
are defined as civil actions “in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more
persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims
involve common questions of law or fact.” Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). It should be
noted, however, that CAFA prohibits MDL consolidation of cases removed to
federal court under the “mass action” provision, unless “a majority of the plaintiffs
in [the mass action] request transfer pursuant to section 1407,” the mass action is
“certified pursuant to [R]ule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” or
“plaintiffs propose that the [mass] action proceed as a class action pursuant to
[R]ule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. § 1332(d)(11)(C)(i)–(ii).
Citing these provisions, the JPML recently refused to order MDL consolidation of
several cases that had been removed to federal court on the basis of CAFA’s mass
action provision. See In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 923
F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2013).
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) (2006) (providing that CAFA’s expanded
minimal diversity provisions do not apply when more than two-thirds of the
putative class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the forum state);
Id. § 1332(d)(3) (providing that courts have discretion to decline jurisdiction when
more than one-third but less than two-thirds of the putative class members and the
primary defendants are citizens of the forum state).
173. As far as theoretical possibilities go, it is conceivably possible that the
omnibus class action pretrial order proposed above could be neutralized if separate
single-state putative class actions are filed in each of the state court systems that
authorize the use of class actions before any multistate or nationwide class actions

480

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

Finally, it should also be noted that transferee courts need not
worry that, by issuing an omnibus class action pretrial order, they
may unwittingly lose subject matter jurisdiction over putative class
actions in the MDL that have been filed or removed solely upon the
basis of CAFA’s minimal diversity provisions. Shortly after CAFA
was enacted, some district courts initially concluded that because
CAFA’s expanded minimal diversity provision applies “to any class
action before or after the entry of a class certification order by the
court with respect to that action”174 and given that a “class
certification order” is defined as “an order issued by a court
approving the treatment of some or all aspects of a civil action as a
class action,”175 then the subject matter jurisdiction conferred by
CAFA must be lost after denial of class certification because the
case is “no longer a class action.”176 But the federal courts of
appeals have now weighed in and made clear that the denial of class
certification does not strip courts of subject matter jurisdiction under
CAFA.177 As Judge Posner explained, this is because “jurisdiction
attaches when a suit is filed as a class action, and that invariably
precedes certification.”178 Accordingly, the issuance of an omnibus

are filed in connection with a given mass tort. But that remote possibility should
not deter transferee courts from making a habit of issuing an omnibus class action
pretrial order at the inception of any MDL that contains at least one putative
personal injury class action.
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) (2006) (emphasis added).
175. Id. § 1332(d)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
176. Ronat v. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, No. 05-520, 2008 WL
4963214, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2008). See also McGaughey v. Treistman, No.
05 Civ. 7069(HB), 2007 WL 24935, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007).
177. See United Steel v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If
a defendant properly removed a putative class action at the get-go, a district
court’s subsequent denial of Rule 23 class certification does not divest the court of
jurisdiction, and it should not remand the case to state court.”); Cunningham
Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that
“federal jurisdiction under [CAFA] does not depend on certification”); Vega v. TMobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1268 n.12 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that
“jurisdictional facts are assessed at the time of removal” and that “post-removal
events (including non-certification, de-certification, or severance) do not deprive
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction”); see also G. Shaun Richardson,
Class Dismissed, Now What? Exploring the Exercise of CAFA Jurisdiction After
the Denial of Class Certification, 39 N.M. L. REV. 121, 135 (2009) (arguing that
“CAFA cannot be read to require certification of a class or the continuing presence
of a class as a prerequisite to the exercise of CAFA jurisdiction”).
178. Cunningham Charter, 592 F.3d at 806 (“All that section 1332(d)(1)(C)
[which defines ‘class certification order’] means is that a suit filed as a class action
cannot be maintained as one without an order certifying the class. That needn’t
imply that unless the class is certified the court loses jurisdiction of the case.”).
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class action pretrial order will not undermine an MDL transferee
court’s jurisdiction over putative class actions.
V. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding that personal injury claims are no longer
certified as litigation classes, the pesky persistence of the class
action tolling doctrine allows potential mass tort plaintiffs’
individual statutes of limitations to be tolled in many jurisdictions
by virtue of nothing more than the filing of a putative personal
injury class action in a related case—provided that courts do not
immediately strike such class allegations or otherwise deny class
action status to personal injury claims as soon as they become aware
of them. And in contemporary multidistrict litigation, which is
increasingly being resolved by non-class aggregate settlements, it is
simply not the case that “a little tolling never hurt anyone.” Rather,
by permitting and/or encouraging potential plaintiffs to sit in the
shadows and not come forward to assert their claims, the class
action tolling doctrine can delay and altogether undermine efforts to
resolve modern mass tort litigation by creating disabling uncertainty
about current and future plaintiff populations.
Accordingly, this Article has proposed that transferee courts
should reexamine their current tendency to defer consideration of
class action issues in mass tort MDLs. Instead, transferee courts
should issue an “omnibus class action pretrial order” at the inception
of any MDL that contains at least one putative personal injury class
action. That omnibus order should do at least four things: (i) strike
all current and future personal injury class allegations from all
current and future complaints in the MDL; (ii) deny all current and
future requests for personal injury claims to be certified as litigation
classes; (iii) explicitly provide that the purpose of the order is to
suspend any and all tolling of the applicable statute(s) of limitations
that might otherwise occur as a result of the class action tolling
doctrine; and (iv) make clear that the parties are not precluded from
subsequently seeking certification of one or more settlement classes.
Such an order would short-circuit any harmful impact that the class
action tolling doctrine might otherwise impose without precluding
the parties from subsequently seeking to use the class action device
to implement a global settlement, and it is a modest modification of
current MDL practice that should be implemented in mass tort
cases.

